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OVER  THE  LAST TWO  DECADES the U.S.  economy has experienced a 
dramatic deterioration  in both productivity and profit performance. 
After averaging  more than 2.5 percent per year in the 1950s  and early 
1960s,  labor  productivity  growth  in the nonfarm  sector slowed to about 
2 percent per year between 1965  and 1973,  and then plummeted  to less 
than 1 percent  per year  between 1973  and 1980.  At about  the same time, 
the return  on capital also sagged: after averaging 16 to 17 percent of 
output in the 1950s and early 1960s, net capital income (before-tax 
economic profits plus net interest paid) of nonfinancial  corporations 
dropped  to 13  to 14  percent  of output  by the mid-1970s. 
Neither of these phenomena is well understood. The substandard 
performance  of productivity  in the 1970s  has been variously  attributed 
to higher  energy  prices, the "baby  boom" population  entering  the labor 
force, inadequate  incentives for innovation  and capital  formation,  the 
general  uncertainty  that  inflation  brought  to the economic  environment, 
and a range of other possibilities. However, the case for any of these 
explanations  of the productivity  slowdown  is empirically  unproven  and 
the slowdown remains  a puzzle.  I Similarly,  the "profit  squeeze" of the 
Comments  by Steven Braun,  James  Glassman,  David Stockton,  and members  of the 
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1. A discussion  of various  attempts  to explain  the  productivity  slowdown  can  be found 
in Edward F. Denison,  Accounting for  Slower Economic  Growth: The United States  in 
the 1970s  (Brookings  Institution,  1979),  chapter  9. A wide range  of hypotheses  is also put 
forward  in  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston,  The Decline  in  Productivity  Growth, 
Conference  Series  22 (FRBB, 1980). 
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late 1960s  and  early 1970s  has  been widely  analyzed.2  Some  investigators 
emphasize the correlation between the rate of return to capital and 
productivity  growth  while others cite sticky real  wages or deteriorating 
terms  of trade;  but a convincing  explanation  has yet to be made. 
Despite this general lack of understanding,  a feeling has arisen that 
both  productivity  growth  and returns  to capital  should  be substantially 
higher  in the 1980s  than  they were in the 1970s.3  Part  of this recent  wave 
of optimism  can be attributed  to a reversal  in most of the factors  that  are 
usually blamed for the slowdown: energy prices have stabilized; the 
baby boom population  has been absorbed  by the labor  force; research 
and  development  spending  is up; and  the overall  inflation  rate  is down. 
In  addition,  it is widely  believed  that  the hardships  of the early  eighties 
have paved the way for substantially  improved  economic performance 
for  the  rest  of this  decade  and  beyond.  Much  anecdotal  evidence  supports 
this view: after draconian  cost-cutting  measures, the U.S. automobile 
industry posted record profits last year; a huge amount of  aging, 
unproductive  steel capacity  has been eliminated;  work-rule  changes  and 
other efficiency improvements  in a number of industries have been 
reported. On some interpretations,  aggregate  data also suggest some 
improvement  in the underlying  trend  in labor  productivity  and  the return 
to capital.  In  the last half  of 1982,  productivity  grew 1.8  percent  per  year, 
even though the recession had not yet ended; since the end of the 
recession, productivity has continued to  improve and profits have 
skyrocketed,  with nonfinancial  corporations  posting  an 85 percent  gain 
during  1983. 
In this paper, the empirical  evidence for and against  a fundamental 
improvement  in labor  productivity  growth  and corporate  profitability  is 
2. For the United States, see Martin  Feldstein  and others, "The Effective  Tax Rate 
and the Pretax Rate of Return, " Journal of Public Economics,  vol. 21 (July 1983), pp. 129- 
58. For cross-country  comparisons  of the profit  squeeze, see Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Real 
Wages and Unemployment  in the OECD Countries,"  BPEA, 1:1983, pp. 255-89, and 
Michael Bruno, "Raw Materials,  Profits, and the Productivity  Slowdown," Working 
Paper  660  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1981). 
3. For example,  the cover story  in the February  13, 1984,  issue of Business Week  was 
"The Revival of Productivity."  It included  projections  by John Kendrick  and Nestor 
Terleckyj  that  productivity  growth  in the 1980s  would  average  2.5 to 3 percent,  more  than 
four times the 1973-79 rate. In "Will Productivity  Growth  Recover? Has It Done so 
Already?"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  74 (May  1984, Papers  and Proceedings, 
1983),  pp. 231-35, Martin  Neil Baily's optimism  is guarded,  but he still concludes that 
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considered  in some detail, first by an examination  of the raw data and 
then  through  a simple  econometric  model  that  exploits the interrelation- 
ship among  productivity,  price-cost margins,  and income from capital. 
Because cyclical variability  is important  when the economy has been 
operating  well below capacity, as in 1980-83, substantial  emphasis is 
placed  on consistent cyclical adjustment  of the variables  in the system. 
A Look at the Data 
The records  of labor  productivity  and  of capital's  share  of output  over 
the last 30 years4  are illustrated  in figure  1. The sharp  rise in both series 
in 1983  might  be interpreted  as the start  of a longer-term  improvement 
in efficiency  and  profitability.  However, productivity  and  the net capital 
share  typically increase  during  a recovery, so the correct  interpretation 
of the recent statistics  requires  a more  careful  analysis. 
The parallel behavior of productivity and profits arises from the 
accounting  identity  relating  factor  payments  to total output: 
(1)  (price  level) (real  output) =  (economic  profits + net interest  payments) 
+ (hourly  wage  costs) (labor  hours) 
+ (indirect  business  taxes) 
+ (depreciation). 
In  the early stages of a recovery, real  output  rises faster  than  labor  input, 
boosting labor  productivity;  since prices and wages tend to move more 
smoothly  over time, the rise in  productivity  flows  directly  to the "bottom 
line," increasing profits. This process unwinds later in the business 
cycle, as labor  input  first  catches up with output  and then overshoots it 
late in the expansion. 
Although  much of the cyclical movement  in income  from  capital  can 
be traced to productivity  developments, additional  variation  can arise 
4. Throughout  the  paper,  the sum  of net  interest  and  before-tax  economic  profits  (book 
profits adjusted  for inventory valuation  and the difference  between replacement-cost 
depreciation  and  depreciation  allowable  for tax purposes)  divided  by gross value  added  is 
used as the measure  of income  accruing  to capital.  Returns  both  to equity holders  and  to 
bond holders  must  be counted  when calculating  the income  from  capital.  Also note that 
for a given debt/equity  ratio, the distribution  of this income  between  profits  and interest 
changes  dramatically  with  the inflation  rate.  The inflation  premium  in the nominal  interest 
rate  is a payment  for a reduction  in the real  value  of indebtedness  and  is therefore  a part  of 
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Figure 1.  Labor Productivity and Net Capital Share, 1954:1 to 1983:4a 
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Source:  U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis and U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
a.  Shaded areas indicate periods of recession. 
b.  Private nonfarm business sector. 
c.  Economic  profits before taxes plus interest as a percent of gross domestic product, nonfinancial corporate business 
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from changes in the margin between prices and standard  unit labor 
cost-compensation  per hour divided by trend productivity. Conse- 
quently,  in the discussion below, the difference  between the price level 
and standard  unit labor cost will be examined as an intermediate  link 
between productivity  and profits.  Indirect  business taxes and deprecia- 
tion also add to the cyclical variation  in the net capital  share. Neither  is 
sensitive to output  in the short run,5  so as output  increases, their share 
of the total declines. 
Table 1 provides a close-up view of labor productivity,  price-cost 
margins,  and  the net capital  share  in the vicinity  of business  cycle peaks 
and  troughs.  It compares  the data  for the recent  recession and  recovery 
with  the historical  range  of performance  for  the previous  postwar  cycles. 
Between 1981:3  and 1982:3, labor productivity  fell only 0.6 percent, 
substantially  less than  the decline of 2.5 percent  in 1973-74;  however, in 
the six recessions before 1973, productivity  usually grew in the year 
following the business cycle peak. In the year after the business cycle 
trough  in 1982,  labor productivity  growth  was fairly strong  in absolute 
terms  but certainly  not by historical  standards;  the rise of 3.3 percent  is 
smaller than in any of the six postwar recoveries before 1980. Even 
productivity  performance  in the first  half  of 1983  was not outstanding;  it 
rose 2.6 percent, compared  with 4.1 percent  in the first  two quarters  of 
recovery in 1975. 
The price-cost margin  fell unusually  fast in the last quarters  of the 
1981-82 recession, as shown in table 1. This could be construed as 
evidence that  the productivity  growth  trend  has improved,  but  given the 
data on labor productivity  discussed above, it seems more likely to be 
related  to the extraordinary  depth  of the downturn  or the strength  of the 
dollar. Since the end of  1982, the price-cost margin has remained 
constant-right in line with historical  experience. During  the first year 
of six previous  recoveries, the price-cost  margin  fell four  times and  rose 
twice. 
Recent movements in the net income from capital follow a pattern 
that is  consistent with the behavior of productivity and price-cost 
margins.  Given the margin  squeeze just noted, the decline in capital's 
5. Depreciation  is a slowly changing  fraction  of the capital  stock, so it is not sensitive 
to short-term  fluctuations  in output.  Indirect  business  taxes include  some items that are 
not  a function  of output  (such  as real  estate taxes)  and  taxes on other  items, such  as crude 
oil and  gasoline,  that  are  not very cyclical. C~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C 
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share should also be larger  than usual;  indeed, it was more precipitous 
than that recorded  in any other postwar  recession. The profit  recovery 
after 1982:4  is very strong, producing  a recovery in the capital share 
comparable  to 1958-59 and at the high end of the historical  range;  but 
given the 1981-82 decline, it is hard to tell whether the rebound is 
signaling  a change in underlying  trends or just eliminating  an earlier 
aberration. 
Overall,  the data  in table 1  reveal  no major  trend  shifts  in productivity 
or profits since mid-1981.  The recent recovery in productivity  appears 
rather  weak  by historical  standards  and  seems to offset the slightly  better 
than average performance  during  the last half of 1982.  And the strong 
rebound  of income from  capital  in 1983  may be only offsetting  the steep 
decline in 1981-82. However, different  business cycles have different 
characteristics;  rough  cyclical comparisons  can obscure  effects that are 
related  to the severity  of different  recessions  and  the strength  of different 
recoveries. In the following section a simple econometric model of 
cyclical productivity  and capital income behavior  is proposed, and its 
theoretical  foundation  is discussed;  in succeeding  sections  its parameters 
are estimated, and the model is used to examine underlying  trends in 
productivity  and  profits. 
A Partial-Adjustment  Model of Productivity, Price-Cost 
Margins, and the Net Income from Capital 
Cyclical variations  in labor input arise as a reaction to the cyclical 
movement of real output, and most prices are closely related  to costs, 
possibly with some adjustment  for the pressure of demand. Thus the 
cyclical behavior of productivity  and capital income can be analyzed 
using  a model with three equations: 
(2)  log (1 -  Dt -  Tt -  PR,) =  [Wt -  (Yt -  Ht)] -  Pt 
(3)  Ht,= a,llt-  + (Il-a)H,*  + ut 
(4)  P,=  cP,_-  +  (1-c)P,*  +  Vt, 
where 
P  =  the log of the price level 
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W =  the log of compensation  per hour 
H  =  the log of hours  of labor  input 
PR  =  economic profits  and net interest  as a share  of output 
T =  indirect  business taxes as a share  of output 
D  =  depreciation  (valued  at replacement  cost) as a share  of output 
u, v  =  disturbance terms 
* =  the target  value of a variable  (as discussed later  in the text). 
Equation  2 is merely a rearranged  version of identity 1; it says that 
the log of labor's share  of output  equals the log of unit  labor  cost, [W, - 
(Y, -  H,)], minus  the log of the price  level, P,. 
Equations  3 and  4 are  the behavioral  equations  in the system  for labor 
input  and for the price level, respectively. Each is a partial-adjustment 
model in which the dependent  variable  (either  H, or Pt) is adjusted  part 
of the way between its value  in the previous  period  and  a target  value  for 
the current  period. 
In the case of labor  input,  H,  such a partial-adjustment  model arises 
from  assuming  that  the cost of deviating  from  desired  labor  input,  H,, in 
any given period  and  the cost of adjusting  labor  input  from  one period  to 
the next are both quadratic.  The sum of these two costs in each period 
is then 
(5)  Ct = A (Ht -  Ht_  1)2  +  B (Ht -  H,')2. 
The dynamic  optimization  problem  facing each firm  in the economy 
at time t can be given as: 
00 
Minimize  (Et >  Rs Ct+s)  with respect to Ht, H,+ 1,.  .  . 
s =o 
where R is a discount factor less than one. Since Ct is quadratic,  the 
principle  of first  period  certainty  equivalence  can  be employed,6  yielding 
the following  solution: 
00 
(6)  Ht -  aH,_  1  = (1 - a)(1  - b) >  bs  Et  H+  s 
s=O 
where a <  1 and b <  1 are parameters  that depend on the relative cost 
coefficients A and B and the discount factor R.7 In the simplest case, 
6.  See Herbert  A. Simon,  "Dynamic  Programming  Under  Uncertainty  with  a  Quadratic 
Criterion  Function,"  Econometrica,  vol. 24 (January  1956),  pp. 74-81. 
7. Quadratic  adjustment  cost models  for labor  input  have  a long history  dating  back  at Peter K. Clark  141 
desired labor input is assumed to be output divided by the underlying 
trend  in productivity,  but more  complex formulations  can also be used. 
Note that equation  6 implies that  H* in equation  3 can be expressed as 
follows: 
00 
(7)  H*=  (1-b)  E  bs Et H+ 
s=O 
where the target  value for hours  is a geometrically  weighted  average  of 
current and expected future values of optimal labor input. As  the 
adjustment  cost rises relative  to the cost of deviation  from  optimal  input 
(that is, A/B increases), the coefficients a and b both increase, and 
guessing  the right  value  of future  optimal  input  becomes  more  important; 
firms  want hours to be in the right  place in the future  so they can avoid 
changing  them. Conversely, if adjustment  costs become negligible, a 
and b both decrease, and adjustment  is nearly complete in one period. 
Firms can ignore  future  desired inputs because the cost of adjusting  to 
any new desired level is fairly small. If expectations  are static, and the 
current  level of Ht'  is expected to persist into the future,  then Ht*  = Ht' 
and 
Ht-  aHI=  (1-a)H'  +  u. 
In the less  restrictive case  where expectations are assumed to be 
"forward-looking,"  equation  6 can be estimated  only after  a reasonable 
representation  of EtHt+s  is found. 
With  the same sort of adjustment-cost  assumption  for the price  level, 
formulas  similar  to equations  6 and  7 can be derived: 
(8)  P,-  cP,_  =  (l-c)P,* 
(9)  Pp*  = (I -ed)  o  n  Et  P  a'te  s =O 
The parameters c and d again depend on relative adjustment cost  and 
least to Charles C. Holt and others,  Planning  Production,  Inventories  and  Work Force 
(Prentice-Hall,  1960).  More  recent  work  includes  Christoper  A. Sims, "Output  and  Labor 
Input  in Manufacturing,"  BPEA,  3:1974,  pp. 695-728;  Thomas  J. Sargent,  "Estimation  of 
Dynamic  Labor  Demand  Schedules  Under  Rational  Expectations,"  Journal  of Political 
Economy,  vol. 86 (December  1978),  pp. 1009-44;  and  John  Kennan,  "The Estimation  of 
Partial  Adjustment  Models  with  Rational  Expectations,"  Econometrica,  vol. 47 (Novem- 
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the discount factor used, and the price target is again a geometrically 
weighted  average  of "desired" prices expected in the future.  Under  the 
(unrealistic)  assumptions that the current price level is expected to 
prevail  in the future  (ErP'+s  = P,) and that  adjustment  of the price level 
is not very costly, equation  8 (with  the addition  of the usual  disturbance 
term)  becomes: 
(10)  Pt  =  PI  +  Vt. 
If the desired price level P, is a function of standard  unit labor cost 
(measured  as hourly  compensation  divided  by the trend  in labor  produc- 
tivity), materials  prices, and  demand  pressures,  equation  10  implies  that 
the price level is determined  by a markup  over costs, with the markup 
varying  over the business cycle. In first-differenced  form, equation  10  is 
similar  to the "structural"  inflation  equations  estimated  by a number  of 
authors.8 If the expected future  price level is different  from  the current- 
period  price level, then the expression for P* is more complicated  and 
contains  future  expected cost increases. The weight of expected future 
costs in the price target  depends on the cost of price adjustment;  as in 
the case of labor demand,  if adjustment  is expensive, prices should be 
smooth relative to input costs and follow them with a substantial  lag. 
Conversely, if prices are easy to adjust,  they should  follow costs fairly 
closely. 
I now turn to the estimation of equations 6 and 8, using them to 
construct cyclical adjustments  for labor productivity,  price-cost mar- 
gins, and net income from  capital. 
Cyclical Behavior and Underlying Trends in Labor Productivity 
While the theory of labor demand  discussed above implies a simple 
partial adjustment of hours to a moving target of desired hours as 
indicated  in equation  6, estimation  of this equation  is complicated  by the 
fact  that  both  the desired  number  of labor  hours  in any  given  time  period, 
8.  For instance,  see  Otto Eckstein,  ed.,  The Econometrics  of Price  Determination 
(Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve  System, 1972);  Charles  L. Schultze, "Falling 
Profits,  Rising  Profit  Margins,  and  the Full Employment  Profit  Rate," BPEA,  2:1975,  pp. 
449-71; and Robert  J. Gordon, "Can the Inflation  of the 1970s  Be Explained?"  BPEA, 
1:1977, pp. 257-77. Peter K. Clark  143 
H,', and previous expectations about H' are unobservable.  To resolve 
the problem,  equation  6 has been estimated  under  a number  of assump- 
tions about Ht*, the target value of labor input at time t.  If static 
expectations  are  assumed,  then  the target  value  H* is taken  to be current 
output divided by the trend level of productivity, so Ht* =  Yt -  f(t), 
where  f(t) is a broken-line  trend  for the log of trend  productivity.  This 
yields the regression  equation 
(11)  AHt =  a, (Yt -  Ht-1)  -a,  ao -a,  a2 (TIME) -  a, a3  (T66) 
-  a, a4 (T73) -  al  a5  (T79) -  al a6(T83) 
-  a,  a7 (Y,  -  YPt)  +  ut, 
where TIME  is a time trend (1, 2, 3, ...)  running  throughout  the data 
period. The other time trends start as follows: T66 in 1966:4;  T73 in 
1973:4;  T79  in 1979:4;  and T83  in 1983:1.  The variable YPt  is the log of 
potential  output  in  the  private  nonfarm  sector  based  on an  unemployment 
benchmark  that is 4.5 percent  in 1955  and  rises gradually  to 6 percent  in 
1978.  When  expectations  are  assumed  to be forward-looking,  H* is given 
by equation  7, and  the implied  regression  is virtually  identical  to equation 
11  with Y* =  (1 -  b) I A o  bs Et Y+s substituted for Yt.9 
In either case, the ai coefficients have the following  interpretations: 
a, is the partial-adjustment  coefficient, or the fraction of desired total 
adjustment  of hours completed in one quarter;  ao  and a2  through  a6  are 
coefficients on the (log of the) trend level  of productivity. The a7 
coefficient  allows the level of productivity  used in the labor  input  target 
to change over the business cycle,  reflecting output mix effects: if 
cyclically sensitive industries  have higher  than  average  labor  productiv- 
ity, then the hours  target  should  be relatively  low when these industries 
are near capacity, and relatively  high  when a higher  proportion  of total 
output  is produced  in other sectors. 
In table 2, expectations are assumed  to be static, so that equation 11 
is estimated  directly. The first  and third  columns, which have no output 
gap term  (Yt -  YPt),  show no increase  in trend  labor  productivity  either 
since the end of 1979 or the beginning  of 1983. With the output gap 
9.  Equation  11  with Y*  replacing  Y,  is only an approximation  to the correct  regression 
in the forward-looking  expectations  case. A distributed  lead on  f(t) should  be included, 
but  this  generates  a highly  nonlinear  estimation  equation.  Sincef(t) moves smoothly  over 
time,  futuref(t)  terms  can be included  in the constant  a, ao. 144  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
included  in the second and  fourth  columns,  thus allowing  for output-mix 
effects, the results are a little more optimistic;  they show an increase  of 
0.25 percent  per year starting  in 1980,  or 0.5 percent  per year starting  in 
1983. However, the t-statistic  for each of these changes is about 0.5- 
not very convincing evidence that any substantial  improvement  has 
taken  place. It should  also be noted  that  the output  gap  measure  included 
in  the second  and  fourth  columns  is based  on a  benchmark  unemployment 
rate of 6 percent;  with a higher  unemployment  benchmark,  the average 
ratio of actual to potential  output  would be smaller  in 1980-83, and the 
estimated  trend  growth  rate  for productivity  would  be reduced. 
In all the regressions  in table 2, the estimated  autocorrelation  coeffi- 
cient of the residuals  is about  0.65 and  the partial-adjustment  coefficient 
is about  0.5. Without  the autocorrelation  adjustment,  the partial-adjust- 
ment  coefficient  falls to about  0.4. Autocorrelated  errors  may  have been 
generated by the rough (broken line) approximation  to the trend in 
productivity;  for  example,  if the trend  growth  rate  was not quite  constant 
Table  2. Regressions  for Changes  in Labor  Hours  Assuming  Static  Expectationsa 
Coefficient  1954:1-1983:4  1954:1-1979:3 
a,  Partial  adjustment  0.485  0.563  0.489  0.559  0.461  0.518 
to output  (0.032)  (0.046)  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.036)  (0.049) 
a2  Trend  productivity  2.63  2.58  2.63  2.59  2.63  2.58 
growth rateb  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.25) 
a3  Trend change  -  0.65  -  0.57  -  0.64  -  0.59  -  0.65  -  0.57 
in 1966:4b  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.21)  (0.20)  (0.22)  (0.17) 
a4  Trend change  -  1.12  -  1.12  -  1.17  -  1.04  -  1.07  -  1.05 
in 1973:4b  (0.30)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.20)  (0.33)  (0.27) 
a5  Trend change  -0.10  0.27  . .  .  . ..  ..  .. 
in 1979:4b  (0.46)  (0.42) 
a6  Trend change  . .  .  . .  .  0.22  0.55  . ..  ... 
in  1983:lb  (1.41)  (1.20) 
a7  Output gap effectc  . . .  0.172  . . .  0.161  . .  .  0.157 
(0.063)  (0.061)  (0.068) 
Summary statistic 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.45  0.43  0.45  0.43  0.44  0.43 
R2  0.80  0.82  0.80  0.82  0.80  0.81 
Rho  0.65  0.66  0.66  0.65  0.64  0.61 
Source:  Equation  11. 
a.  Private nonfarm business  sector.  Numbers  in parentheses  are standard errors. 
b.  Percent per year, obtained by multiplying regression coefficients  and standard errors on trend variables by 400. 
c.  Percent change in target productivity  level,  from a  1 percentage  point change in  YIYP. Peter K. Clark  145 
between 1954  and 1966, serially correlated  residuals  would have been 
generated  even if partial  adjustment  was the correct  model. 
The relatively low partial-adjustment  coefficients in table 2 suggest 
that adjustment  costs are high enough to make expected future  output 
important  in current  hours  decisions if firms  have  forward-looking  rather 
than static expectations. To investigate this possibility, EtYt+.  was 
approximated  with forecasts derived  from a simple second-order  auto- 
regression  representation  for the output  gap:  10 
(12)  Yt -  YPt =  1.44(Yt1  -  YPt1)  -  0.48(y2  -  YPt2)  + wt. 
(0.07)  (0.07) 
Forecasts of future  output  are then assumed  to be based  on equation  12; 
that is,"1 
Et Yt+  1 =  YPt+  1 +  1.44 (Yt -  YPt) -  0.48 (Yt- I -  YPt- 1) 
Et Yt+2  =  YPt+2  +  1.44 (Et Y,+  1 -  YPt+  1) -  0. 48 (Yt -  YPt). 
Y*  can then be approximated  by 
l  4 
y,*~  .bsErYt+. 
const s=0 
if b is not too large (b is slightly smaller than one minus the partial- 
adjustment  coefficient, or about  0.5, to begin  with).  12 
10. Potential  output  YP,  in the private  nonfarm  sector  was estimated  as a slowly rising 
fraction  of potential  gross national  product  over time.  The potential  GNP series is similar 
to the  ones in Peter  K. Clark,  "A Kalman  Filtering  Approach  to the  Estimation  of Potential 
GNP" (Yale University,  November  1983). 
11. A consensus of economic forecasts from the American  Statistical  Association- 
National Bureau  of Economic Research survey of forecasters  was substituted  for the 
forecasts  from equation  12, but the results  changed  very little. This is probably  because 
simple  time series models forecast about  as well as the standard  econometric  services. 
See Charles  R. Nelson, "A Benchmark  for  the  Accuracy  of Economic  Forecasts  of GNP," 
Working  Paper 11 (University of Washington,  Center for the Study of Banking and 
Financial  Markets,  1983). 
12. To make  the  coefficients  in  the sum  for  E,Y  +5consistent  with  the  partial-adjustment 
coefficient  obtained  in the regression,  it is necessary to iterate  by first  forming  the sum 
with  an initial  guess, then  doing  the regression  to find  a new partial-adjustment  coefficient 
to use in the sum,  and  so forth.  This  process  converges  in only two or three  iterations. 146  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
This procedure  gives the "forward-looking  expectations" results in 
table 3.  Not  surprisingly, since the target value for hours includes 
(higher)  future  values, the partial-adjustment  coefficient  falls  from  0.5 to 
about  0.4. The output  gap  term  essentially  disappears;  this suggests  that 
an alternative  to output-mix  effects for explaining  low productivity  at 
low levels of capacity  utilization  is that  firms  expect output  to rise in the 
future and therefore employ more hours than they would if they had 
expected output  to remain  permanently  low. 
Forward-looking  expectations may also explain Gordon's end-of- 
expansion overhiring  effect.  13 If firms  are perennially  optimistic  in the 
Table 3.  Regressions for Changes in Labor Hours Assuming Forward-looking 
Expectationsa 
Coefficient  1954:1-1983:4  1954:1-1979.3 
a,  Partial  adjustment  0.383  0.387  0.384  0.385  0.370  0.372 
to output  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.029)  (0.027)  (0.032) 
a2  Trend  productivity  2.57  2.57  2.58  2.58  2.57  2.57 
growth  rate  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.23) 
a3  Trend  change  -  0.57  -  0.57  -  0.59  -  0.59  -  0.58  -  0.57 
in 1966:4  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
a4  Trend  change  -  1.15  - 1.15  -  1.07  -  1.07  -  1.11  -  1.11 
in 1973:4  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.19)  (0.19)  (0.27)  (0.27) 
a5  Trend change  0.19  0.21  . .  .  . .. ... 
in 1979:4  (0.37)  (0.40) 
a6  Trend change  .  .  .  ...  0.14  0.15  ... 
in 1983:1  (1.38)  (1.40) 
a7  Output gap effect  . . .  0.015  . . .  0.004  .  .  .  0.009 
(0.060)  (0.058)  (0.067) 
Summary statistic 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43 
R2  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.81  0.81 
Rho  0.44  0.44  0.45  0.45  0.45  0.45 
Source:  Equations  II and  12. See  discussion  in text. 
a.  See  table 2, notes  a-c. 
13. See Robert J. Gordon, "The 'End-of-Expansion  Phenomenon'  in Short-Run 
Productivity  Behavior,"  BPEA,  2:1979,  pp. 447-61. Gordon  found  that  during  the last  half 
of the expansion  phase  of most  business  cycles, labor  input  gradually  rises  to a level about 
2 percent above its predicted  value. This excess is then worked off in the subsequent 
recession  and  recovery.  The partial-adjustment  model  used in this paper  cuts the end-of- 
expansion  effect to about  1 percent  but  does not eliminate  it. Peter K.  Clark  147 
period  before a recession, they will tend to overhire  and  reduce  produc- 
tivity. This sort of "overshooting  expectations" is implicit  in responses 
to the capital  spending  surveys of both the U.S. Commerce  Department 
and McGraw-Hill:  businessmen almost always overestimate future 
investment immediately  before a recession and underestimate  future 
investment  during  a recovery. 
Estimates  of a recent change  in the trend  growth  rate of productivity 
are uniformly  small in table 3, strengthening  the conclusion that there 
has been little or no shift in the rate of fundamental  efficiency gain. 
However, the standard  error  for a change in trend  productivity  growth 
at the beginning  of 1983  is 1.5  percentage  points, implying  that  one year's 
data  are insufficient  for discovering  a change  in trend. 
All cyclical adjustments  rely on history repeating  itself. If firms  did 
less labor  hoarding  during  the 1980  or 1981-82  recessions, then more  of 
the recent productivity  gain would be trend  and less would be cyclical 
rebound.  The regressions  in table 4 investigate  this possibility  together 
with the possibility  that  a more significant  trend  shift  might  be found  if it 
were dated starting  in 1981  :3,  just before  the recession deepened, rather 
than  in 1979:4.14  No significant  rise in the partial-adjustment  coefficient 
is found, either at the end of 1979  or in the middle  of 1981,  as shown by 
the insignificant  coefficients in the second and third rows. Evidently, 
labor input  did not react to output  any faster in the 1980s  than it had in 
the past, so it is unlikely that less of the recent productivity  surge is 
cyclical. Furthermore,  the  estimated  change  in  trend  productivity  growth 
remains  both statistically  and arithmetically  small when the change is 
allowed  to start  in 1981:3,  as in the eighth  row of the table. 
Recent Productivity Movements 
In view of the statistical evidence in tables 2 through 4 that no 
important  change  has  occurred,  what  caused  the  recent  wave of optimism 
about productivity?  In part it may have come from the rise in actual 
14. Note that  if the partial-adjustment  coefficient  a, is allowed  to change,  then  the time 
trend coefficients a I  ao, a I  a2, and so on, must change in a consistent way. This nonlinearity 
in estimation  was again  resolved  by iteration.  The change  in a, was estimated  assuming 
constant  values for a, ao, a, a2, and so on. Then the implied  change  in these coefficients 
was plugged  into TIME,  T66, . . .,  and  the change  in a1  was re-estimated.  Given  the small 
value  for the change  in a1,  this process  converges  in two iterations. 148  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
Table 4.  Alternative Post-1979 Hypotheses in Labor-Hours Regressions, 1954:1-1983:4a 
Static expectations 
with output  gap  Forward-looking 
Coefficient  effect  expectations 
a,  Partial  adjustment  0.559  0.556  0.385  0.382 
to output  (0.046)  (0.046)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
al  Change in adjustment  0.001  .  .  .  0.001  ... 
coefficient  in 1979:4  (0.002)  (0.002) 
a'"' Change in adjustment  .  .  .  -0.001  .  .  .  -0.002 
coefficient  in 1981:3  (0.002)  (0.002) 
a2  Trend  productivity  2.58  2.58  2.58  2.57 
growth  rate  (0.22)  (0.22)  (0.18)  (0.18) 
a3  Trend  change  in 1966:3  - 0.57  - 0.56  - 0.58  - 0.56 
(0.17)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.16) 
a4  Trend  change  in 1973:4  -  1.08  -  1.14  -  1.10  -  1.18 
(0.27)  (0.23)  (0.25)  (0.21) 
a5  Trend change in 1979:4  0.32  . ..  0.26  ... 
(0.42)  (0.40) 
a'  Trendchangein  1981:3  .  .  .  0.42  . ..  0.04 
(0.65)  (0.70) 
a7  Output  gap effect  0.172  1.177  ...  .. 
(0.06)  (0.06) 
Summary  statistic 
Standard  error 
of estimate  0.43  0.43  0.43  0.43 
R2  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.82 
Rho  0.63  0.65  0.43  0.43 
Source:  Table 2, second  and fourth columns,  and table 3, first and third columns, 
a.  See  table 2, notes  a-c. 
productivity of the past several quarters. In the last half of  1982, 
productivity  improved  even though  output  was still  falling,  an event that 
first kindled hopes that the abysmal productivity  performance  of the 
1970s had finally ended. Then in the first three quarters of  1983, 
productivity  rose at the rate of 4.5 percent per year, reinforcing  the 
optimism  that had  emerged  the previous  year. 
However, the comparison in table 5 of actual productivity with 
projections  from  the equation  in the fifth  column  of table  3 indicates  that 
both  these productivity  spurts  are  short  run  in character.  The  projections 
assume the productivity  trend  starting  in 1979:4  is 1.0 percent  per year, 
0.15 percentage  points higher  than  the trend  rate  estimated  for 1974-79. 
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Table 5.  Actual and Projected Labor Hours and Labor Productivity Growth, 
1981:  1-1984: 1 
Productivity  growth 
Labor hours  (percent  per year) 
(billion  hours  per year)  Difference 
Year  and  Difference  (percent- 
quarter  Actual  Projected  (percent)  Actual  Projected  age points) 
1981:1  147.9  146.3  1.1  5.1  4.4  0.8 
2  148.1  146.7  0.9  0.4  -  0.3  0.7 
3  148.2  147.6  0.4  3.8  1.9  1.9 
4  146.7  146.4  0.2  -  4.5  -  5.3  0.8 
1982:1  144.4  144.9  -  0.4  0.1  -  2.2  2.3 
2  144.8  144.3  0.3  -0.4  2.5  -  2.8 
3  143.7  143.7  0.0  2.3  1.1  1.2 
4  141.8  142.6  -0.5  1.3  -  1.0  2.3 
1983:1  142.2  142.7  -  0.4  3.5  4.3  -  0.8 
2  144.4  144.7  -  0.2  7.1  7.5  -  0.4 
3  146.6  146.6  0.0  2.3  3.1  -  0.8 
4  148.4  148.5  0.1  2.7  2.4  0.3 
1984:1  151.0  150.9  0.1  2.6  3.0  -  0.4 
Source:  Projections  based  on coefficients  in fifth column  of table 2,  starting in  1979:4, with  1.0 percent  per year 
1980-84  trend productivity  growth  assumed.  Data for last two  quarters from BLS  productivity  data released  April 
1984. 
the extra increase partly offset the exceptionally  poor performance  in 
the second quarter  of the year. One possible explanation  is that many 
firms  believed that  the recession had  ended  early  in 198215  and therefore 
began  to increase  labor  input;  when  output  continued  downward,  another 
round of layoffs ensued, raising  productivity  because output declines 
were tapering  off. In 1983, productivity  gains were reasonably  strong, 
though  actually smaller  than might  have been expected, and they were 
below expectations again in the first quarter  of 1984. Since the third 
quarter  of 1983,  labor  input  has  just matched  the level projected  by the 
equation,  which  uses an underlying  productivity  trend  of 1.0  percent  per 
year. 
Productivity  optimism may also have arisen because of changes in 
factors  that have often been blamed  for the productivity  slowdown. The 
baby  boom generation  is now well on its way to being  assimilated  by the 
15. For example,  the Economic Report of the President,  February 1982 said that "At 
the time this Report  was prepared  [January  1982],  it appeared  that the recession which 
started  in August ... will be over by the second quarter  of 1982"  (p. 25). This was in line 
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labor  market,  inflation  is declining, energy prices have stabilized, and 
substantial  incentives for plant modernization  and new research and 
development  were put in place in 1981.  So the stage seems to be set for 
stronger  productivity  performance.  But emphasis should be placed on 
the word seems because none of the voluminous literature on the 
productivity  slowdown can account  for even half  of the total slowdown 
after 1973  ;16 if the factors cited cannot  account  for the disappearance  of 
productivity  growth,  their  abatement  should  not be expected to produce 
its reappearance.  On the other  hand,  if some combination  of the factors 
listed above did contribute  importantly  to the slowdown, their reversal 
should have produced some improvement  in the underlying  trend of 
productivity  growth. Optimists might argue that these factors are all 
secular  in nature  and that more than two or three years may be needed 
for changes in them to affect productivity.  For example, high inflation 
rates (and  the high variance  of relative  prices that goes with them)  may 
have reduced  the rate of productivity  growth  by diverting  management 
attention  away from real efficiency gains and toward "paper  entrepre- 
neurship"  -financial  innovation  to take advantage  of price  instability.  17 
The  fact that  the inflation  rate  has declined  substantially  and  productivity 
growth  has not improved  would not eliminate  this possibility,  because it 
could take a long time for firms  to turn  their attention  back to physical 
efficiency  improvement.  The same sort of timing  argument  would apply 
to demographic  factors, research and development, and particularly 
capital stock growth, which slowed substantially  as a consequence of 
the 1981-82 recession. Nonetheless, if these factors did contribute  to 
the slowdown, their improvement  should have produced  at least some 
rise  in the productivity  trend,  time  lags notwithstanding;  apparently  they 
have not. 
Price-Cost Margins and the Business Cycle 
The income from capital has a strong cyclical component that is 
related  both to the cyclical movement  in labor  productivity  and to any 
changes  in the margin  between  output  price  and  standard  unit  labor  cost. 
16.  See Denison, Accounting for Slower Economic  Growth. 
17. See Peter  K. Clark,  "Inflation  and  the  Productivity  Decline,"American  Economic 
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Therefore  an examination  of the cyclical behavior  of price-cost  margins 
is a necessary intermediate  step in the cyclical adjustment  of income 
from capital. A substantial  amount of research has been done on the 
cyclical behavior  of markups;  many authors  have investigated  inflation 
equations  similar  to equation  10.  Most of these studies  have found  either 
no effect or only a small  effect of demand  pressure  on prices once labor 
costs have been taken  into account.  For example,  Nordhaus  and  Godley 
found that the business cycle had little or no effect on markups  in the 
United Kingdom  between 1954  and 1968,  and Schultze concluded that 
excess capacity  had  little effect on margins  in the United  States  between 
the  mid-  1950s  and  the  mid-  1970s.  18  Such  findings  seem  roughly  consistent 
with  the cyclical  comparison  data  in  table 1,  which  showed  no discernible 
effect of the business cycle on the price-cost  margin.  However, Gordon 
has found a variety of demand  effects that influence  price markups;  for 
example, in 1977  he concluded  that  a decline  in output  that  increased  the 
gap  between potential  and  actual  gross national  product  by 1  percentage 
point would reduce the inflation  rate by 0.2 percentage  points over a 
period  of two years, holding  labor  and  materials  costs constant.  19 
The magnitude  of this "price-cost squeeze" coefficient  is important 
in the cyclical adjustment  of income  from  capital.  If it is negligible,  then 
an examination of profits in the 1980s requires no allowance for the 
substantial  amount  of slack that  has persisted  for the last four years. On 
the other hand, if Gordon's estimate is correct and the "no squeeze" 
unemployment  rate is 6 percent, then the price level has been reduced 
approximately  4 percent  by the cumulative  excess unemployment  since 
the beginning  of 1980. Such a reduction  would have a major  impact  on 
the net capital  share. 
MARGINS  IN  NONFARM  BUSINESS 
The specific  form  of equation  8 used  to estimate  the price-cost  squeeze 
effect is similar  to the regression  equation  for productivity.  Assuming 
that  P* = S* + g(t), so that  the target  value  for the log of the price level 
is a combination  of present  and  future  standard  unit  labor  costs, S*, plus 
the markup  as a function  of time, g(t), yields: 
18. William  D. Nordhaus  and  Wynne  Godley,  "Pricing  in  the  Trade  Cycle," Economic 
Journal,  vol. 82 (September  1972),  pp. 853-82, and  Schultze,  "Falling  Profits." 
19. Gordon,  "Can  the Inflation  of the 1970s  Be Explained?" 152  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
(13)  APt =  b1(S* -  Pt1)  +  b1bo  +  b1b2(TIME)  +  b1b3  (T65) 
+  b1b4(T71)  +  b1b5(T79)  +  b1Ecs(Yts  -  YPt-1) 
+  b1b6Dot  +  b1b7Dct  +  ut, 
wherePt  =  log ofthe price level (as before), S*  =  EdsEtSt+s,  aweighted 
average of the log of current  and expected future standard  unit labor 
costs St, and TIME is a time trend (1, 2, 3, ...) running  throughout  the 
data  period.  The other  time trends  start  as follows: T65 in 1965:  1; T71 in 
1971:  1; and T79 in 1979:4.  The variable  Dot is the oil price dummy:  0.0 
before 1974:2,  rising  linearly  to 1.0 in 1975:  1, then falling  linearly  to 0.0 
in 1977:  1, and  0.0 thereafter.  The variable  Dct  is the price  control  dummy: 
0.0 before 1971:4;  rising linearly to 1.0 in 1973:1, 1.0 from 1973:1  to 
1974:  1, then falling  to 0.0 in 1975:1  .20 When  price adjustment  costs are 
negligible,  b1 =  1 and  St*  is merely  the log of current  standard  unit  labor 
cost, or  compensation  per  hour  divided  by the trend  level of productivity. 
If prices are allowed to adjust  more slowly to labor  cost, then S* is the 
log of current  standard  unit labor  cost plus an adjustment  for expected 
future  cost inflation. 
Regression  estimates  of equation  13  are  given in table  6 for the private 
nonfarm  business sector deflator.  The price-cost squeeze term, in the 
seventh line of table 6, is uniformly  small in each regression, with the 
coefficient  on output  gaps half its standard  error  or less, indicating  that 
the level of demand affects the rate of price inflation  only indirectly 
through the wage rate. Thus, it appears that only a small cyclical 
adjustment  to the net capital share will be required  for the price-cost 
squeeze effect. 
The  other  regression  variables  in  table  6 are  all  dummies  or  time  trends 
that have no structural  significance.  However, they do provide a con- 
venient characterization  of changes in the price-cost margin  over the 
last 30 years. The coefficient of the price controls dummy,  in the ninth 
row, indicates  that the imposition  of price controls depressed  the price 
level about  2 percent  relative  to labor  costs from 1971:4  through  1973:  1, 
and  that their  removal  after  early 1974  raised  the price level by an equal 
amount.  This symmetry  is imposed  by the form  of the dummy  variable.2' 
20. The variable  Dc, is the integral  of the price controls  dummy  used by Gordon  in 
"Can  the Inflation  of the 1970s  Be Explained?"  Integration  is required  because equation 
13  is an equation  for the price  level rather  than  for the inflation  rate. 
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Table  6. Regressions  for the Private  Nonfarm  Business  Sector  Deflatora 
1954:1-1983:4  1954:1-1979:3 
Partial  Partial  Partial  Partial 
adjustment  adjustment  adjustment  adjustment 
uncon-  constrained  uncon-  constrained 
Coefficient  strained  to 1.0  strained  to 1.0 
b,  Partial  adjustment  1.14  1.0  1.13  1.0 
to labor  costs  (0.10)  . .  .  (0.10)  ... 
bo  Constant  term  0.407  0.403  0.399  0.398 
(0.041)  (0.012)  (0.039)  (0.007) 
b2  Trend  starting  1954:1  0.097  0.123  0.144  0.156 
(0.098)  (0.080)  (0.055)  (0.048) 
b3  Trend  change in 1965:1  - 0.388  - 0.422  - 0.441  - 0.452 
(0.183)  (0.165)  (0.117)  (0.106) 
b4  Trend  change in 1971:1  0.025  0.049  0.030  0.021 
(0.163)  (0.157)  (0.114)  (0.109) 
b5  Trend  change in 1979:4  0.452  0.453  . ..  ... 
(0.233)  (0.228) 
Yc,  Sum of output  gapsb  0.017  0.024  0.003  0.006 
(0.039)  (0.041)  (0.032)  (0.032) 
b6  Oil price dummy  0.025  0.026  0.026  0.028 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
b7  Price controls dummy  - 0.022  - 0.021  - 0.020  - 0.019 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Summary  statistic 
Standard  error  0.0036  0.0036  0.0032  0.0032 
of estimate 
R2  0.95  0.95  0.96  0.96 
Rho  0.82  0.77  0.74  0.67 
Source:  Equation  13. 
a.  See  table 2, notes  a and b. 
b.  Sum of unconstrained  coefficients  in current and four lagged quarters; units are percent change  in price level 
resulting from a  1 percentage  point change in  YIYP. 
The time  trend  coefficients  indicate  that  prices  fell relative  to standard 
unit labor costs by nearly  0.3 percentage  points per year between 1965 
and 1979.  More  recently, however, price-cost  margins  seem to be rising 
by about  0.2 percentage  points  per  year.  Given  the  income  shares  identity 
(equation 1 or 2), these trends should be reflected  in the income from 
capital. 
downward  dip  of 2 percent.  Alan  S. Blinder  and  William  J. Newton  found  a deflection  of 3 
or 4 percent  in "The 1971-1974  Controls  Program  and the Price Level: An Econometric 
Post-Mortem," Journal of Monetary Economics,  vol. 8 (July 1981), pp. 1-23. 154  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
MARGINS  EXCLUDING  OIL  AND  GAS 
The estimates in table 6 are less than satisfactory in at least two 
respects.  First, oil price  effects are  captured  only with  a dummy  variable, 
and competition from foreign imports is ignored altogether.22  In an 
attempt to remedy these shortcomings, equation 13 was reestimated 
using a deflator for the private nonfarm business sector excluding 
domestic oil and natural  gas production.23  With  the effect of oil and gas 
prices  removed, it is possible to explore  the effect of other  import  prices 
on domestic price margins. This is done by including  the Commerce 
Department's  unit value index for nonpetroleum  imports  on the right- 
hand side of equation 13 to capture  a "competing  goods" effect.24  The 
regression  results are given in table 7. The output  gap coefficients are 
insignificant  and arithmetically  small and have the wrong sign. This 
supports  the finding  from  table  6 that  there  is no price-cost  squeeze effect 
discernible  in the data. 
The "competing  goods" coefficient  on import  prices has the correct 
sign but is small. The estimate is greatly influenced  by events since 
exchange rates started  moving over a wide range.  The relative  price of 
imports rose substantially  after the shift to floating  exchange rates in 
1973,  which helps explain  the bulge  in price-cost  margins  in that  period. 
In 1976-78 the relative  price of imports  stayed high, but the price-cost 
margin  fell. This episode holds down the "import  competition"  coeffi- 
cient.25  In any case, any reasonable  estimate of this coefficient implies 
only slight effects on the U.S. inflation  rate. For example, between the 
end of 1979  and the end of 1982,  the price of non-oil imports  fell about 
22. Recently Gordon  has emphasized  the importance  of the external  sector in price 
determination.  See his "Inflation,  Flexible Exchange Rates, and the Natural  Rate of 
Unemployment,"  in Martin  Neil Baily, ed.,  Workers,  Jobs, and Inflation (Brookings 
Institution,  1982),  pp. 89-152. 
23. To adjust  the deflator  for  changes  in crude  oil and  natural  gas prices  in 1974-75  and 
1979-80,  domestic  output  of crude  oil and  natural  gas in current  and  constant  dollars  was 
estimated  and  then subtracted  from  current-  and  constant-dollar  private  nonfarm  output. 
The  ratio  of these "ex oil and  gas" output  figures  gives a value-added  deflator  that  excludes 
oil and  gas bulges,  assuming  a one-for-one  passthrough  of oil and  gas costs in the prices  of 
finished  goods. 
24. Because  a value-added  deflator  is being  used, the direct  effect of import  prices  (for 
raw  materials  or  component  parts)  is already  excluded.  However,  imports  compete  directly 
with  domestically  produced  goods  in  a number  of sectors  and  may  play  a role  in  determining 
domestic  prices. 
25. In "Inflation,  Flexible Exchange Rates," Gordon estimates an exchange rate Peter K. Clark  155 
Table  7. Regressions  for the Private  Nonfarm  Business  Sector  Deflator  Excluding 
Production  of Crude  Petroleum  and Natural  Gasa 
1956:3-1983:4  1956:3-1979:3 
Partial  Partial  Partial  Partial 
adjustment  adjustment  adjustment  adjustment 
uncon-  constrained  iuncon-  constrained 
Coefficient  strained  to 1.0  strained  to 1.0 
b,  Partial  adjustment  1.09  1.0  1.08  1.0 
to labor  costs  (0.10)  . . .  (0.10) 
bo  Constant  term  0.405  0.390  0.397  0.387 
(0.038)  (0.015)  (0.040)  (0.016) 
b2  Trend  starting  1956:3  0.088  0.176  0.137  0.193 
(0.112)  (0.095)  (0.106)  (0.106) 
b3  Trend  change in 1965:1  - 0.165  - 0.255  - 0.202  - 0.261 
(0.191)  (0.165)  (0.182)  (0.180) 
b4  Trend  change in 1971:1  - 0.594  - 0.678  - 0.740  - 0.758 
(0.200)  (0.191)  (0.195)  (0.199) 
b5  Trend  change in 1979:4  0.290  0.387  . ..  ... 
(0.289)  (0.286) 
Yc,  Sum of output  gapsb  - 0.023  - 0.051  - 0.041  - 0.053 
(0.043)  (0.048)  (0.042)  (0.045) 
b7  Price controls  dummy  - 0.027  - 0.024  - 0.027  - 0.026 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
b8  Non-oil import  pricesc  0.018  0.037  0.048  0.053 
(0.021)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.025) 
Summary  statistic 
Standard  error  0.0040  0.0040  0.0037  0.0037 
of estimate 
R2  0.97  0.98  0.98  0.97 
Rho  0.77  0.71  0.79  0.75 
Source:  Equation  13. 
a.  See  table 2, notes  a and b. 
b.  See  table 6, note b. 
c.  Regressor  is  the  log of  (unit value  index  for non-oil  imports divided  by the  "ex  oil  plus gas"  deflator),  so  a 
coefficient of 0.1 indicates  that a 10 percent rise in the relative price of non-oil imports raises domestic  non-oil prices 
by  1 percent. 
15 percent relative  to the price of private  nonfarm  output  in the United 
States. The coefficient of 0.04 in the second column of table 7 implies 
that  this relative  import-price  decline reduced  the level of the domestic 
price  deflator  by 0.6 percent  spread  over  four  years;  a coefficient  as large 
as 0.1 would imply a reduction  of 1.5 percent, which is still small  when 
coefficient  of about 0.1 in a reduced-form  equation  for prices. Substantial  differences 
between his equations  and those in table 7 make it unclear  whether  the two results are 
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compared  to the 30 percent  rise in non-oil  prices over those four years. 
However, such a change  would represent  a noticeable  movement  in the 
price-wage margin. 
The time trend coefficients differ between tables 6 and 7, revealing 
the effect of energy prices in the table 6 estimates. In particular,  much 
of the upward  trend  in the aggregate  price-cost  margin  since the end of 
1979  can be attributed  to the second OPEC  price  shock  and  the decontrol 
of oil and gas prices. As table 7 shows, when oil and gas are removed 
from  the domestic  value-added  deflator,  the estimated  trend  in the price- 
cost markup  for the remainder  of nonfarm  business remains negative 
(about - 0.4 percent  per year). The trends  over different  subperiods  are 
shown below for the equation  in the second columns  of tables 6 and  7. 
Percent per year 
Nonfarm business 
Nonfarm business  ex oil and gas 
1956:3-1964:4  0.12  0.18 
1965:1-1970:4  -0.30  -0.08 
1971:1-1979:3  -0.25  -0.76 
1979:4-1983:4  0.20  -  0.37 
It should be emphasized that the import competition and oil price 
effects discussed  above, as well as the slow drift  of the price  level relative 
to standard  unit  labor  cost captured  in the time-trend  dummies  in tables 
6 and 7, are very small compared  with the strong  association of prices 
with labor cost. As shown in figure  2, changes in the price deflator  can 
be closely approximated  by changes  in standard  unit  labor  cost. (Figure 
2 would  be virtually  unchanged  if the "ex oil and  gas" deflator  had  been 
plotted instead of the unadjusted  deflator.)  The difference  between the 
two series is largely unsystematic, which explains why it is difficult  to 
find  large  price-cost squeeze and import  competition  influences.  Given 
the weak and unstable effect of the business cycle on the ratio of the 
price deflator  to standard  unit labor cost, adjustment  of the price-cost 
margin  is not required  when capital's share  of output  is adjusted  for the 
business cycle in the following  section. 
The Cyclical and Secular Behavior of Capital's Share of Output 
The implied cyclical adjustment  of capital's net share of output is 
given by the differential  of equation  2: Peter K. Clark  157 
Figure 2.  Changes in  Price  Deflator and Standard  Unit  Labor  Cost,  Private Nonfarm 
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Source:  Same  as  figure  1. 
a.  Change over four quarters. 
(14) dPR =  -dD  -dT  +(I  - D-T  -PR)[d(P  -W)  +d(Y  -H]. 
Cyclical variations  around  trend  are small  enough  for equation  14  to be 
a reasonable  approximation;  it says that cyclical movements  in the net 
capital share (PR) are the sum of four terms: the cyclical variations  in 
the depreciation  share, the indirect  business tax share,  labor  productiv- 
ity, and the price-cost margin.  When  output  increases  relative  to trend, 
D and T  both decline, productivity  increases, and  the price-cost  margin 
is not  affected  significantly.  Thus  only  the  first  three  terms  are  empirically 
important  and all have the same sign. 
The cyclical adjustments  for economic depreciation and indirect 
business taxes are estimated  by assuming  that  neither  is affected  by the 
business  cycle  (note 5), so dD  =  D(YP/Y  -  1) and dT =  T(YP/Y -  1). 
The  adjustment  for cyclical movement  in labor  productivity  is calculated 
by comparing  estimates of productivity  at potential  and actual output 
derived  from the regression  coefficients in the third  column of table 3. 
As indicated by equation 14, this difference has to be multiplied  by 
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Table 8.  Net Capital Share of Gross Domestic Product, Nonfinancial Corporations, 
1981-1983a 
Percent 
Adjustment  for cyclical variation 
Total  Cyclically 
Year  and  Net capital  Depreciation Indirect  tax  Labor  cyclical  adjusted  net 
quarter  share  share  share  produlctivity adjuistmnent  capital  share 
1981:1  12.1  0.39  0.37  0.15  0.91  13.0 
2  12.1  0.49  0.43  0.38  1.30  13.4 
3  13.0  0.43  0.40  0.24  1.07  14.1 
4  12.3  0.77  0.68  1.28  2.73  15.0 
1982:1  11.2  1.04  0.90  1.81  3.75  15.0 
2  10.9  1.12  0.95  1.57  3.64  14.5 
3  10.6  1.24  1.05  1.57  3.86  14.5 
4  9.9  1.46  1.24  1.90  4.60  14.5 
1983:1  10.7  1.39  1.21  1.37  3.97  14.7 
2  11.9  1.10  1.00  0.31  2.41  14.3 
3  12.9  0.95  0.87  - 0.03  1.79  14.7 
4  13.8  0.86  0.79  - 0.04  1.61  15.4 
Source:  U.S.  Bureau of Economic  Analysis  and cyclical  adjustment procedure described  in text. 
a.  Net  capital income  is economic  profits before  taxes  plus net interest payments. 
The effect of these cyclical adjustments  for the period 1981-83 is 
shown  in table 8. On an unadjusted  basis, the net capital  share-before- 
tax economic profits  plus net interest divided by gross domestic prod- 
uct-dropped 3.1 percentage  points in the 1981-82  recession, reaching 
a record  low in 1982:4.  About 1.7 percentage  points of this decline can 
be attributed  to the productivity  weakness that accompanied  the reces- 
sion, while 1.9 percentage  points come from the added share  of output 
allocated to cyclically insensitive depreciation  and indirect business 
taxes as the output base is reduced, bringing  the total estimated effect 
of the recession to 3.5 percentage  points. Thus, net income  from  capital 
fell a little less  than expected, given the steep output decline that 
occurred,  and the cyclically adjusted  capital  share actually  rose during 
the 1981-82  recession. 
From  1982:4  to 1983:4  the net capital  share  rose 3.9 percentage  points, 
of which 1.9  points  can  be attributed  to the  cyclical  upturn  in  productivity 
and  another  1.1 points to the decline in the tax and depreciation  share. 
The cyclically adjusted net capital share rose 0.9 percentage points 
further  in the first  four quarters  of recovery, to a level of 15.4 percent. 
That  level is higher  than  the average  of 14  percent  that  prevailed  during 
the 1970s  but still well below the 16  to 17  percent  of the 1950s  and 1960s. Peter K. Clark  159 
Figure 3.  Actual and Adjusted Net Capital Share, Nonfinancial Corporate Business Sector, 
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Source  Actual  share  from  U.S. Bureau  of Economic  Analysis.  Adjusted  share  calculated  by  using  equation  in  second 
column  of table  6 to remove  estimated  effects  of business  cycle, price  controls,  and  first  OPEC  oil price  shock 
Thus, it appears  that  profits  have been slowly improving  in the 1980s  but 
not as much as might be inferred  by looking at the raw data for 1983. 
Data are not available  for calculating  the capital  share  excluding  the oil 
and natural  gas sectors, so it is not possible to sort out the effects of 
changing  energy prices (including  the effects of the second world oil 
price shock and decontrol of domestic oil prices) from the net capital 
share  as a whole. 
The reasons for the marked  decline in capital's share in the last half 
of the 1960s and its partial  rebound  in the 1980s  remain  unclear.26  As 
shown  in figure  3, after  cyclical adjustment  the decline  appears  as a slide 
extending  from the mid-1960s  to the early 1970s. Since this is the same 
period  in which the inflation  rate climbed  rapidly  and  labor  productivity 
growth  began to slow, figure  3 suggests that the profit  decline may be 
linked  to rising  inflation  or slowing  productivity  growth. 
None of the hypotheses that tie the decline in capital's share to the 
26. See Martin  Feldstein  and Lawrence  Summers,  "Is the Rate of Profit  Falling?" 
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Table 9.  Net Capital Share, Depreciation, and Capital Gains on Debt, Nonfinancial 
Corporations, 1954-83 
Percent 
Replacement  Capital  gains 
cost minus  book  on long-term 
depreciation  as  liabilities  as 
Cyclically  a share of  a share of 
adjusted  net  gross domestic  gross domestic 
Years  capital share  product  producta 
1954-59  16.7  1.6  1.3 
1960-64  17.3  -0.1  -0.4 
1965-69  16.3  -0.8  2.7 
1970-74  14.0  -0.2  -0.1 
1975-79  13.5  -  1.0  1.1 
1980-83  14.2  0.1  0.8 
Source:  For first and second  columns,  same as table 8; for percentage  capital gain on long-term Treasury bonds 
as used  in third column,  Roger G.  Ibbotson  and Rex  A.  Sinquefield,  Stocks,  Bonds,  Bills,  and Inflation:  The Past 
and the Future (Charlottesville,  Va.: The Financial Analysts  Research  Foundation,  1983). 
a.  Capital  gains  calculated  by  multiplying  year-end  long-term  debt  outstanding  (from Federal  Reserve  flow-of- 
funds accounts)  by the percentage  capital gain on a long-term Treasury bond portfolio. 
increase  in inflation  or  to the decline  in  productivity  growth  is completely 
satisfactory,  but some are better than others. For example, it could be 
argued  that markups  were based on historical-cost  depreciation  or the 
historical  cost of borrowing  (that is, the capital  gains from unexpected 
reductions in the real value of indebtedness were passed through to 
customers),  leading  to a decline in margins  calculated  on a replacement 
cost basis, as they are in figure  3. However, the data  in table  9 show that 
neither  the difference  between replacement  cost and book depreciation 
(the second column)  nor the capital  gains on nonfinancial  corporations' 
long-term  indebtedness (the third column) are large enough, or timed 
properly,  to explain  the variations  in the net capital  share.  The  maximum 
difference  between replacement  cost and  book depreciation  in table  9 is 
only 1 percent of output, and for only one five-year  interval  (1975-79). 
Capital  gains on long-term  liabilities  are large  enough  to explain  most of 
the net capital  share  decline in the last half  of the 1960s,  but they do not 
explain  why capital  income stayed low in the 1970s.  Substantial  capital 
gains on long-term  debt would have had to extend through  the 1970s  to 
make total income from capital (including  capital gains) equal to pre- 
1965  levels. Nor can the profit  squeeze be explained  by changes in the 
taxation of capital if it is assumed that the after-tax  return  to capital Peter K. Clark  161 
stayed  fixed,  because  it is generally  agreed  that  the tax burden  on income 
from  capital  went up, not down, in the late 1960s  and early 1970s.27 
One conjecture  that at least roughly  fits the facts is that longer-run 
movements  in income shares are determined  by the relative  scarcity  of 
labor  resources.  Generally  tight  labor  market  conditions  in the late 1960s 
and  early 1970s  could  have shifted  the balance  of power  in  favor  of labor, 
cutting  into capital's share. This new division of output  prevailed  until 
the determination  to reduce inflation  even at the risk  of protracted  high 
unemployment  started  moving  the balance  of power  back  toward  capital 
in the 1980s. The mid-  1970s downturn  might have been ineffective in 
changing  the climate  for income-share  determination  because the recov- 
ery was relatively rapid, and economic policy was explicitly aimed at 
returning  to high levels of output  with less attention  paid to inflation.28 
Back-to-back  recessions in the early 1980s  could have had more of an 
effect on the labor market climate,29  explaining  the apparent  rise in 
capital's  share. 
This "longer-run  labor  scarcity" argument  is at least consistent  with, 
and  may even help explain, the slowdown  in labor  productivity  growth. 
Tight labor markets could have reduced efficiency growth by moving 
less qualified  workers into critical  jobs and stiffened  labor's resistance 
to technological change, thus contributing  to the decline in growth of 
output  per hour  of labor  input.30  Or, if productivity  growth  declined  for 
some  other  reason,  demand  forlabor  would  have  been  increased,  keeping 
labor  markets  tight. 
27. See Feldstein, "The Effective  Tax Rate," or Mervyn  A. King  and  Don Fullerton, 
eds.,  The Taxation of Income From Capital: A Comparative Study of the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden,  and West Germany (University  of Chicago Press,  1983). 
28. The unemployment  rate  hit 9 percent  in May 1975,  but  the recovery  was relatively 
rapid.  Less than  three  years  later  the Carter  administration  had  pushed  the unemployment 
rate below 6 percent and inflation  was again on the upswing. This observation  is also 
consistent  with those of Thomas  E. Weisskopf,  Samuel  Bowles, and David M. Gordon, 
who  found  that  the cost of  job loss did  not rise significantly  in the mid-1970s,  an indication 
that  labor  was still  scarce;  see their  "  Hearts  and  Minds:  A Social  Model  of U.  S. Productivity 
Growth,"  BPEA,  2:1983,  pp. 381-441. 
29. See Robert  J. Flanagan,  "Wage  Concessions  and Long-Term  Union Wage  Flexi- 
bility,"  BPEA,  this issue. 
30. In "Hearts  and  Minds,"  Weisskopf,  Bowles, and  Gordon  use the term  "declining 
work  intensity"  to describe  a general  deterioration  of workplace  cooperation  in the late 
1960s,  to which  they attribute  much  of the productivity  slowdown. 162  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
In any case, the facts seem to be fairly  clear:  while most of the 1983 
profit  rebound  is cyclical, there does seem to be some increase in the 
underlying  share  of output  accruing  to capital.  On a cyclically adjusted 
basis, capital's  net share  fell from 17  percent  of output  in the 1950s  and 
early  1960s  to 14  percent  during  the 1970s.  Starting  in 1980,  its share  has 
started  to rise, reaching 15.4 percent by the end of last year. A part  of 
this  rebound,  particularly  in 1980  and 1981,  may  have come from  the rise 
in the price of domestically  produced  oil and gas. But part, especially 
in 1983, may reveal a recovery in the capital share in the rest of the 
nonfarm  economy. 
Conclusion 
The encouraging  performance  of both productivity  and profits  over 
the last year or two is, to an important  extent, a cyclical reaction  to the 
end of the long 1980-82 decline in output and the strong economic 
rebound  in 1983.  Once  the  estimated  effect  of the  cycle has  been  removed, 
the underlying  trend in labor productivity growth has been about 1 
percent  per year since 1979,  nearly  the same  rate  as in the 1970s  and  only 
half  the long-run  average  (since 1890)  of about  2 percent  per year. 
The apparent  lack of improvement  in the underlying  productivity 
growth  rate casts further  doubt on most of the theories that have been 
used to explain the poor productivity  performance  of the 1970s. Some 
argue  that  slow productivity  growth  was caused  by higher  energy  prices, 
the baby boom, inadequate  incentives to invest, and inflation  and the 
generally  uncertain  economic  environment.  However,  all  of these  factors 
turned  around  in the 1980s. Although  their reversal might  take longer 
than two or three years to  have an effect,  at least some signs of 
improvement  in the productivity  trend  should  be appearing;  but so far, 
there  are none. 
The decline in the rate of return  to capital, which also began in the 
mid-  1960s,  is as puzzling  as the  productivity  slowdown.  Most  candidates 
for explaining  the decline are either quantitatively  too small or are not 
timed  properly  to explain why profits  were squeezed in the last half of 
the 1960s  and failed to rebound  in the following decade. One possible 
explanation  is that capital's share of output is related to the long-run Peter K. Clark  163 
level of labor market  tightness. Higher  output and low unemployment 
in the 1960s  could have shifted the division of income toward  labor, a 
situation  that  was maintained  throughout  the 1970s.  Recently, however, 
the cyclically adjusted  net capital  share  has risen  from  about 13  percent 
in early 1981 to about 15 percent in 1983. We may now be seeing a 
recovery  in the trend  of the capital  share  brought  about  by back-to-back 
recessions that produced more severe adjustments  than occurred in 
typical  cyclical downturns. 
APPENDIX 
Hours, Output,  Prices, and Compensation 
in a Loosely Parameterized  System 
I ANALYZED labor  productivity  and  capital's  net share  of output  by using 
a model (equations  2 through  4) that assumed  that both the demand  for 
labor  and  the price  markup  over costs could  be described  by very simple 
partial-adjustment  equations.  The relationship  between  labor  hours  and 
real output  was assumed  to be one of labor  demand,  with hours chasing 
a target  value determined  by an underlying  trend in labor productivity 
and  autonomous  changes  in output,  rather  than  a production  function  in 
which  output  follows labor  input.  Similarly,  the price  level was assumed 
to move toward  a target  determined  by input  cost and  demand  pressure, 
rather  than  the other way around,  with labor  costs being  determined  by 
the price level through  cost-of-living  adjustments  or other, less formal 
mechanisms. 
To investigate the possibility that changes in hours and prices may 
have appeared  before the corresponding  reactions in output and com- 
pensation, measures of association between H,  Y, P,  and W were 
constructed  and  then decomposed  using  a generalization  of the standard 
Granger-Sims  tests  developed by Geweke.31  Table A-1 presents a 
31. John Geweke, "Measurement  of Linear Dependence and Feedback between 
Multiple Time Series,"  Journal  of the American  Statistical  Association,  vol.  77 (June 
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Table A-1.  Measures of Association Relating Changes in Real Output, Labor Hours, 
Hourly Compensation, and the Price Levela 
Feedback  Feedback 
fr  om  from 
independent  Contempo-  dependent  to 
Dependent  Independent  Total  to dependent  raneouis  independent 
variable  variable  associationi  variable  associationi  variable 
Real output  Labor  hours  0.950**  0.084*  0.822**  0.044 
Labor  hours  Real output  0.944**  0.050  0.822**  0.072 
Compensation  Price level  0.354**  0.044  0.228**  0.080* 
Price  level  Compensation  0.390**  0.066  0.228**  0.096* 
Real output  and  Labor  hours  and 
compensation  price level  1.912**  0.328**  1.333**  0.251** 
Labor  hours  and  Real output  and 
price level  compensation  1.976**  0.261**  1.333**  0.382** 
*  Significant at 5 percent  level  based on large sample distribution. 
** Significant  at 1 percent  level based  on large  sample  distribution. 
a. In each case, the measure  of association  is log (ISI/ISJI)  where  JSI  is the determinant  of the estimated  variance/ 
covariance  matrix  of residuals  in a regression  of the form  yt = B(L)  y, + C(L)  xt + e,. 
decomposition  of the associations between h and y, p and w, and the 
pairs  (h, p) and  (y, w).32 More  than  80 percent  of the association  between 
hours  and output  is contemporaneous,  which indicates  that  it is reason- 
able to estimate how hours will respond to autonomous changes in 
output, as assumed in the text. The feedback from lagged hours to 
current  output  is slightly  stronger  than  the feedback  from  lagged  output 
to current  hours,  but  it is only marginally  significant  and  not inconsistent 
with the idea that labor input chases an output  target. The association 
between changes in the deflator  and  changes  in compensation  is weaker 
than  the one between hours  and output,  but again,  most of it is contem- 
poraneous. Feedback from lagged compensation  to current  prices and 
vice versa is also only on the margin  of significance  (at the 5 percent 
level), which is consistent with the observation  in the text that prices 
adjust  to compensation  within  one period. 
The multivariate  measures  of association  shown in the last two rows 
of table A-I continue  to reflect  the strong  contemporaneous  association 
between hours and output and prices and compensation; they also 
indicate  a substantial  amount  of cross-equation  correlation  (the sum of 
the associations between (y, w)  -and  (h, p) rises almost 50 percent  when 
32. Lowercase  letters  denote  first  differences  of logarithms,  that  is, quarterly  rates  of 
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Table  A-2. Estimated  Disturbance  Correlation  Matrix  for a Vector  Autoregression 
Relating  Changes  in Real Output,  Labor  Hours,  Hourly  Compensation, 
and Price  Level 
Real  Labor  Hourly  Price 
output  hours  compensation  level 
Real output  1.00  ...  ...  ... 
Labor  hours  0.76**  1.00  ...  ... 
Hourly  compensation  0.30**  0.22*  1.00  ... 
Price level  - 0.05  0.27**  0.43**  1.00 
*  Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent  level  assuming  normality. 
**  Significantly different from zero  at the  I percent level  assuming  normality. 
price variables  are allowed in the hours equation  and vice versa). The 
largest cross-equation feedbacks are from lagged hours to  current 
compensation,  which  may  be related  to output  mix  shifts  during  business 
cycle troughs, and from lagged output to current  prices, which is the 
price-cost squeeze effect analyzed  in the text. 
The apparently  complex relationship  involving  hours,  output,  prices, 
and compensation  can be examined  with a minimum  of a priori  theory 
by using  a vector autoregression;33  that  is, each  variable  can  be regressed 
on its own past values and  the past values of all the other  variables  in the 
system. This procedure  avoids a priori  exclusion  restrictions  and  allows 
any of  the variables to  be  endogenous. The behavior of  a vector 
autoregressive  system is best understood  by examining  the contempo- 
raneous correlations  among the error  terms in the equations  for each 
variable  and  the system's impulse  response  functions,  as shown  in tables 
A-2 and  A-3. 
Table A-2 provides reasonably strong support  for the model in the 
text: the two strongest  contemporaneous  correlations  are  between  hours 
and output (0.76) and prices and compensation  (0.43), the two relation- 
ships represented by partial-adjustment  equations in the text.  The 
contemporaneous  feedback  from  output  to prices is insignificant,  in line 
with the results in tables 5 and 6. The contemporaneous  correlation 
between  p and h is not accounted  for in the text; it suggests  that  the two 
33. The rationale  for and  estimation  of vector  autoregressive  systems  is discussed  by 
Christopher  A. Sims in some detail in "Macroeconomics  and Reality," Econometrica, 
vol. 48 (January  1980),  pp. 1-48. Note that  such  a loosely parameterized  system  implicitly 
includes  both  a wage  equation  and  the whole demand  side of the economy-pieces  of the 
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Table A-3.  Responses of Labor Hours, Hourly Compensation, and the Price Level 
to a 1 Percent Impulse in Output 
Percent 
Quarters  Labor  Hourly  Price 
after impulse  hours  compensation  level 
1  0.50  0.07  -  0.03 
2  0.37  0.04  0.09 
3  0.18  0.06  0.04 
4  0.10  0.05  0.04 
5-8a  -0.06  0.02  0.02 
9-16a  -0.01  0.02  0.03 
a.  The response  values  for this period are averages. 
partial-adjustment  models may  be "seemingly  unrelated"  regressions,34 
or that some demand-side  relationship  links the two variables. 
The estimated responses of hours, compensation, and prices to an 
exogenous output shock-"impulse  response functions" that include 
the contemporaneous  disturbances  indicated  in table  A-2-are  shown in 
table A-3. The reaction  of labor  input  is almost exactly the same as the 
one estimated  in the text; first-period  adjustment  of hours  is 0.5 (similar 
to the range  of estimates  in tables 2 and 3), with some overshooting  that 
is eliminated  in the second year after the impulse. The compensation 
response to an output  impulse  (not considered  in the text because there 
is no wage equation  in the system-y  and  w are  both exogenous)  is fairly 
small  and spread  out over a long period  of time. This interaction  (rather 
than any direct effect of output on prices) in turn explains a small, 
extended  price response to an output  shock. 
The vector autoregression  can also be used to test the hypothesis  that 
endogenous  changes in policy or behavior  make  the estimated  relation- 
ship between y, h, w, and  p unstable. In particular,  the possibility of a 
shift in behavior  after  the change  in monetary  policy in late 1979  can be 
examined by allowing the parameters  in the vector autoregression  to 
change after the third quarter of  1979 and testing whether they are 
significantly  different  from the coefficients in the earlier  period. A chi- 
34. Seemingly  unrelated  regressions  are defined  as regressions  whose disturbances 
are contemporaneously  correlated;  the efficiency  of the estimations  for such regressions 
can be improved  by exploiting  this nonzero  covariance.  See Arnold  Zellner,  "An Efficient 
Method  of Estimating  Seemingly  Unrelated  Regressions  and  Tests  for  Aggregation  Bias," 
Journal of the American Statistical Association,  vol. 57 (June  1962),  pp. 348-68. Peter K. Clark  167 
square  test cannot reject the hypothesis of no change at the 10 percent 
level.  In addition, the absence of  equation-by-equation  differences 
cannot be rejected. Evidently, expectations did not change enough to 
make  a significant  difference  in the relationships  estimated  by the vector 
autoregression. 
Overall,  the "minimum  a priori  theory" estimates  in this appendix  do 
not seem to reveal any major flaws in the hours or price equations 
presented  earlier.  Cross-equation  associations (uncovered  in table  A-1) 
may be the most serious problem, but it is also possible that they are 
related  to demand-side  interactions  that  have been ignored  in equations 
2 through  4. A complete  restricted  model  linking  the  four  variables  would 
have to be estimated  if one wanted  to discover  which  restrictions  (if any) 
implied  by equations  2 through  4 are violated. Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert J. Gordon: Clark's  paper  contains  new findings  on three inter- 
related topics: the behavior of productivity growth, the price-cost 
markup,  and  the share  of capital.  He reaches  a major  conclusion  for each 
topic, namely that (a) the underlying trend in the growth of labor 
productivity  does not yet show any acceleration  from its post-1973  rate 
of roughly 1 percent  toward  its historical  (post-1890)  trend  of 2 percent, 
(b)  there  is no significant  impact  of the GNP  gap  on the  price-cost  markup 
and  thus no need to make  a cyclical correction  in evaluating  the behavior 
of the markup,  and (c) the net share of capital has recently recovered 
between one third  and  one half  of its decline  from  the 1960s  to the 1970s. 
I find  Clark's  analysis  that supports  findings  (a) and (c) to be persuasive 
but disagree  with finding  (b). 
A general  reservation  about  the paper  is that  too much  of the analysis 
and conclusions rests on highly constrained  specifications.  The same 
data  could  be explained  in  a much  less constrained  way, and  Clark  shows 
that he recognizes this alternative  methodology  by presenting  a set of 
Granger  and  vector  autoregression  test results  in  an  appendix.  However, 
the appendix  is not integrated  with the tightly  specified  equations  in the 
main  body of the paper  and leaves us wondering  which of the imposed 
constraints  would be supported  by formal  statistical  tests. I would like 
to have seen the regressions  reported  in tables 2, 3, 4, and 6 compared 
with a relatively  unconstrained  equation  explaining  the same dependent 
variable,  together  with intermediate  versions and  formal  F tests for the 
significance  of the imposed  constraints. 
The regressions  in the paper  address  productivity  and price markup 
behavior, while the time path of the net capital share is treated as a 
residual. Most of my reservations  concern the price equations, but let 
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me begin with a few comments  on the productivity  equations.  The first 
thing that one notices about the specification  in equation 11 is that no 
lagged  variable  appears,  except in the term Y,  -  H, ,1.  Contrast  this with 
the typical  equation  used in a bivariate  Granger  test for two variables  in 
quarterly  data; such a test would enter a string  of four or eight lagged 
values of  both the lagged dependent variable and the explanatory 
variable,  which in this case is output Y.  If the hypothesis  being  tested is 
that the output gap, Y -  YP, matters  in addition  to raw output, then 
there  is no reason to omit lagged  values. I can think  of as many  reasons 
why the change  in the output  ratio should matter  as much as the level 
included  in equation 11, so that, at a minimum,  one extra  lag of Y -  YP 
should have been included. Indeed, when moving  from table 2 to table 
3, where static expectations are replaced  by an autoregressive  scheme 
for output, the output gap coefficient declines and loses significance. 
This suggests that a string  of lagged  terms should  have been included  in 
the first  place. The "rho" coefficient  of serial  correlation  declines only 
from  0.66 to 0.45 in moving  from  table  2 to table  3, so I suspect  that  there 
is residual  misspecification  that could be removed  by additional  lags on 
both the explanatory  and  dependent  variables. 
Once  one loosens the specification  of the hours  equation  to allow  both 
output  and  hours  to enter  with several  lags, then one has to confront  the 
troubling  evidence  of the Geweke/Granger  tests hidden  away  in  appendix 
table A-1. These seem to say that most of the relationship  between 
output  and hours  is contemporaneous,  and that  any lagged  effect that is 
present goes more from hours  to output  than output  to hours, as Clark 
assumes in the lagged  adjustment  equation  explaining  hours changes in 
tables 2 and 3. 1 don't believe this implication  of the appendix table, 
having  convinced myself years ago that hours changes  respond  both to 
current  and past output  changes, but I can't feel comfortable  about the 
unresolved  conflict  between the appendix  and  tables 2 and 3. 
Another  step beyond the present  analysis  would  divide  the post-1979 
behavior of nonfarm  private productivity  into its manufacturing  and 
nonfarm  nonmanufacturing  components. There has been an explosion 
of productivity  growth in manufacturing  since mid-1982  that seems to 
push manufacturing  productivity  well above its 1973-79 trend. If the 
total nonfarm  private sector is behaving  consistently with its previous 
trend, as Clark concludes, then the implication  is that the nonfarm 
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down. A merger  of Clark's work on cyclical adjustment  with Martin 
Baily's work on the industry breakdown  of the productivity revival 
would seem a top-priority  item on the research  agenda.  i 
Turning  now to the price  equations  in the paper,  I find  the constraints 
imposed in equation 13 to be more troubling  than those in the hours 
regressions. First, productivity  growth  is entered only in the form of a 
trend, with no role for the deviation  of actual  productivity  growth  from 
trend. Only  the current  level of compensation  (relative  to trend  produc- 
tivity) is allowed to enter, with no consideration  of lags. Third, while 
dummy  variables  for the Nixon controls and "oil bulge" are included, 
there is no exploration of the effect of import prices or the foreign 
exchange  rate except in the non-oil  sector regressions  of table 7. 
The omission of the deviation of productivity  growth from trend 
prevents  Clark  from  providing  a clear  interpretation  of the interrelations 
among productivity, markup, and capital's share. Using lowercase 
letters to represent  percentage  rates of growth,  we can write an identity 
that relates the rate of change  of the price level to the rate of change of 
unit labor cost,  w -  x, and unit labor income, z -  y, where w, x, z, and 
y are the growth rates of the nominal wage, productivity, nonlabor 
income, and  output,  respectively: 
(1)  p  =  a(w  -  x)  +  (1-  a)(z  -  y). 
Here nonlabor  cost includes  not  just Clark's  net capital  income but also 
indirect  business taxes and depreciation.  Equation 1 can be rearranged 
to set inflation  equal  to growth  in actual  unit  labor  cost plus a fraction  of 
any change  in unit  real  nonlabor  income: 
(2)  p  =  w -  x + 
- 
)(z - y). 
a 
Now let us pretend  that there is a "structural"  markup  equation that 
relates price change  to the change  in standard  unit  labor  cost, w* -  x*, 
plus a coefficient  times some demand  variable  d, minus  a fraction  of the 
deviation between actual and trend  productivity  growth, plus a coeffi- 
cient times the difference  between actual  wage growth,  w, and  the wage 
growth concept, w*, used by firms in calculating  standard  unit labor 
cost: 
1. Martin  Neil Baily, "The Productivity  Growth  Slowdown by Industry,"  BPEA, 
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(3)  p  =  w* -  x* +  cd -  b(x -  x*) +  e(w -  w*). 
When equation  3 is substituted  into 2, we obtain the expression for 
the change in real unit nonlabor  cost, which is real net capital income 
per  unit  of output,  if indirect  business taxes and  depreciation  per unit  of 
output  are assumed  to be constant: 
(4)  z -  p  -  y =i  [(I  -  b)(x -  x*) + (1-  e)(w -  w*) +  cd]. 
1-a 
Here we find a crucial  result in the relationship  between productivity, 
price, and  profits  that  is not discussed  in the paper:  the cyclical response 
of profits  to deviations  of productivity  growth  from trend  depends  on b 
and does not occur at all if b is unity. The closer b approaches  zero, the 
more cyclical productivity  fluctuations  pass through  to profits,  and the 
less they affect prices. Similarly, the deviation between actual and 
smoothed wage change also affects the time path of profits, with an 
impact  if e is less than  unity. 
Clark's  price  equations  in table  6 do not include  either  deviation  term. 
The unit labor cost concept is current  wage cost, w, relative to trend 
productivity,  x*. The omission of the productivity  term, which enters 
equation  3 with a minus sign, should bias the coefficient  on the output 
gap toward zero if the productivity  deviation is positively correlated 
with the output  gap, as must surely be the case (here I treat the output 
gap as the log ratio of actual to potential  output).  The omission of w*, 
some sort of smoothed or moving  average  wage concept, also is likely 
to bias toward zero the coefficient on the output gap if w  -  w* is 
positively correlated  with output. 
To limit the length of the comment, I do not report a full set of 
estimated price markup equations. However, I  have done enough 
experimentation  to convince myself that Clark's  low and insignificant 
output  gap coefficients are an artifact  of his particular  specification.  A 
model  I refer  to as A regresses.the  rate  of change  of Clark's  price  variable 
on a constant;  a Nixon control  dummy;  a smoothed  unit  labor  cost series, 
w* -  x*, that  uses Clark's  compensation  data;  a variable  to capture  the 
effect of changes  in the relative  prices of food and energy;  and, last, the 
current  value and  eight  lags of the output  gap.2  An alternative,  model B, 
2. See Robert  J. Gordon,  "Inflation,  Flexible  Exchange  Rates, and  the Natural  Rate 
of Unemployment,"  in Martin  Neil Baily, ed., Workers,  Jobs, and Inflation  (Brookings 
Institution,  1982),  pp. 89-152. The food-energy  variable  is the difference  between the 172  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1984 
replaces  the smoothed  labor  cost series with the current  value and eight 
lags of the difference between the growth rates of compensation and 
trend  productivity.  Both models  A and B were also estimated  using  as a 
dependent  variable  the change in the fixed-weight  GNP deflator. The 
coefficients  and t-statistics  on the output  gap  are as follows. 
Model  A, Clark  price  series  0.137  (2.01) 
Model  B, Clark  price  series  0.061  (0.90) 
Model  A, fixed-weight  deflator  0.123  (2.69) 
Model  B, fixed-weight  deflator  0.087  (1.76) 
It would take much  more  research  to determine  why Clark  finds  such 
weak output gap effects, and how these effects interact  with omitted 
variables.  Perhaps  the various  trend  terms  included  in Clark's  equation 
soak up the output  gap  effect that  I find.  It would  be preferable  to pursue 
this research agenda by running  equations not only for the price-cost 
markup,  but  at the same  time  (with  compatible  data  and  sample  periods) 
for wage costs and  for a reduced-form  equation  relating  inflation  to past 
inflation  (without  any reference to costs). My previous research3  indi- 
cates strong output gap effects in the reduced-form  approach, and I 
suspect that price-cost markup  equations lose  some of the cyclical 
impact  of the output  gap on the inflation  process, owing to simultaneity 
between wage costs and  prices. 
Charles  L. Schultze:  Peter Clark's paper convincingly  argues that the 
behavior  of aggregate  labor  input  in the recession and recovery to date 
offers no evidence of any significant  upward  shift in the disappointingly 
low trend  growth  of productivity.  My comments  on this part  of his paper 
are  mainly  in the nature  of refinements.  I do have more  serious  questions 
about  the second part  of the paper:  his treatment  of price-wage  margins 
suffers from aggregation  and index-number  problems. And in view of 
the shift within the capital stock to shorter-lived  assets, I wish he had 
provided some discussion of whether  the benchmark  for profit  perfor- 
mance  ought  to be stability  in the gross or in the net capital  share. Last, 
growth  rates  of the fixed-weight  personal  consumption  deflator  gross and  net of expendi- 
tures on food and energy. The output gap is the log output  ratio, from appendix  B in 
Gordon  ("Inflation").  The Nixon dummy  is the same  as Clark's.  The smoothed  labor  cost 
series  is the variable  Clark  used in his first  draft,  that  is, c* = 0.2c + 0.8c*. 
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I have some questions  about  his speculation  that  labor  scarcity  explains 
the continued  weakness in the cyclically adjusted  net profit  share. 
Let me start with the productivity  section of the paper and make a 
few comments about the structure  of Clark's adjustment  model. It is 
drawn  from a black box in which the sum of two unspecified  kinds of 
costs, each obeying  a quadratic  function,  is minimized.  The first  kind is 
the adjustment  costs of hiring or firing workers. That cost must be 
balanced  against  the second  kind,  the cost of operating  with  an excessive 
or insufficient  number  of workers. Trying to think about some of the 
specifics  of the mechanism  inside the black  box suggested  a few hypoth- 
eses about the adjustment  process that can be seen as refinements  to, 
and cautions about, the interpretation  of Clark's cyclical adjustment 
model. 
The major cost of adjustment  arises because of the possibility of 
guessing wrong  about  future  output. To a varying  extent with different 
classes of workers,  firms  have to make  an investment  in human  capital. 
Unless the same worker  can be rehired,  firing  skilled  workers subjects 
the firm to the risk that labor requirements  will be higher than were 
anticipated,  and the firm  will have to make additional  training  invest- 
ments. Conversely, hiring  workers whose services subsequently  turn 
out to be unneeded  also wastes human  capital  investment.  This type of 
adjustment  cost equals the expected value of the excess investment  in 
human  capital  associated with actual  output  being  different  from target 
output.  It is in effect indexed  by the risk of having  to reverse a hiring  or 
firing  decision. But if the distribution  of expected outcomes around  the 
target  level of output  is independent  of the size of the most  recent  output 
change, then large output changes can be accompanied by a larger 
adjustment  of employment  without proportionately  increasing  the risk 
of reversal. In the underlying  function these costs are not quadratic. 
Clark's  adjustment  factor  a I  may  well increase  for large  output  changes. 
The other side of the coin is the cost of retaining  excess workers 
during  a period of output  decline or operating  with a suboptimal  work 
force in a period of expansion. Since small numbers  of supernumerary 
workers  can be profitably  put to work for a short time in plant mainte- 
nance and other  jobs, the cost of retraining  excess workers should be 
negligible  for small output declines. But beyond some point the costs 
should  begin  to rise: here the response is nonlinear  and  increasing. 
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coefficient  al may be higher  for large  changes  in output  than  for small. I 
tested this in a rudimentary  fashion. I first  fitted  equations  very similar 
to the ones reported  by Clark  in tables 2 and  3. This first  iteration  gave a 
value for target  hours. I then constructed  a variable  which was equal  to 
the absolute  value  of the change  in  output  whenever  the change  in output 
(relative  to potential  output)  was larger  than  one standard  deviation:  call 
this term large  AGAP.  The nonlinear adjustment coefficient a,  + 
all(large  AGAP) was estimated. The all component of the coefficient 
was significant  at the 5 percent  level. What  it showed  was an adjustment 
coefficient for small changes in the GAP that was less than Clark's 
adjustment coefficient but rose toward 0.5 when very large output 
changes  occurred.  This modification  implies  a slightly  different  cyclical 
pattern of productivity growth but should not yield any results that 
change Clark's basic conclusions about the absence of a substantial 
recent improvement  in productivity. 
If cost minimization  dictates carrying  excess workers in periods of 
recession, then output itself may be endogenous  to employment  deci- 
sions. If excess workers  are  to be carried,  why let them  sit around  doing 
nothing?  Since the marginal  cost of extra output  is small, it may pay to 
produce more for inventory. Or, since "true" marginal  costs are low, 
prices may be cut and extra sales and output  generated.  I have no idea 
how quantitatively  important  this might be,  but to the extent it is 
significant  it will tend to bias Clark's  a, adjustment  coefficient  up. And 
since the potential output consequences of carrying  excess  workers 
during  recession are asymmetrical  with the consequences of carrying 
insufficient  workers during  booms, some distinction  in the coefficient 
between upward  and downward  movements  may be needed. 
Turning  to the rest of the paper, I will comment on two aspects of 
Clark's treatment  of the net capital share. First, in his equation that 
explains the margin  of prices over standard  unit labor costs he uses a 
price deflator  and a "raw" measure of compensation  per hour (total 
payrolls  divided  by aggregate  hours  worked).  But  this  choice of measures 
generates  what I believe may be substantial  aggregation  problems.  The 
price deflator  is a Paasche index; as a consequence the index change 
from one period to the next will tend to be biased down relative to a 
Laspeyres fixed-weight  price index during  years after the 1972 base 
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for the composition of output to shift toward products  whose relative 
prices have fallen.' There is no reason to believe that there is any 
systematic  cyclical behavior  to such output  shifts. (A regression  of the 
ratio of the private nonfarm  deflator  and a fixed-weight  index for the 
same sector does not yield a significant  coefficient  on current  or lagged 
values of the output gap.) Changes in the raw compensation index, 
however, are systematically  affected  by any shift  in employment  toward 
industries  that have absolutely  higher  wages (regardless  of how wages 
have changed since the base period). And we know that there is a 
systematic tendency for output  to shift toward  high-wage  industries  in 
expansion  and  vice versa  in  recession. Hence araw compensation  index, 
because of changing product mix, will systematically vary around a 
fixed-weight  wage index in a procyclical  manner. 
The first  column  of the table  below shows the regression  coefficients 
on lagged values of the output gap in an equation whose dependent 
variable  is the ratio of the raw BLS index of private  nonfarm  compen- 
sation  per  hour  to an  index  of nonfarm  wages and  salaries  that  is adjusted 
to exclude  both  overtime  in  manufacturing  and  the  effects  of interindustry 
shifts.2  The raw  compensation  index systematically  increases  relative  to 
the fixed-weight  index as the lagged  output  gap increases. (A regression 
of manufacturing  hourly earnings  including  overtime on an index ex- 
cluding  overtime suggests that overtime  is not the principal  reason for 
this  behavior.)  Thus, there  is a tendency  for Clark's  compensation  index 
to behave procyclically-albeit  with a rather  long lag-for  reasons of 
product-mix  change.  The  procyclical  shift  in employment  toward  higher- 
1. The base year for the deflators  in the national  income accounts is 1972.  In years 
before  1972  the Paasche  index  increases  more  than  a fixed-weight  index  since  the "given" 
year  in  the Paasche  index  is the earlier  year.  From  1972  on, the  deflator  will  tend  to increase 
less than  a fixed-weight  index, because  in years  after 1972  the given year  will be the later 
year.  From 1959  to 1972  the ratio  of the deflator  to the fixed-weight  private  nonfarm  index 
rises  by 3.2 percent  and  from  1972  to 1980  it falls  by 3.7 percent.  The  entire  move  represents 
a monotonic  mix shift toward goods whose relative supply price has fallen. The total 
divergence  of levels for the 21-year  period  is substantial-approximately  7 percent. 
2. This index is a modification  of the fixed-weight  index introduced  by Robert J. 
Gordon,  "Inflation  in Recession and  Recovery,"  BPEA, 1:1971,  pp. 115-16;  the index  of 
hourly  earnings,  adjusted  for overtime  in manufacturing  and  interindustry  shifts,  is blown 
up each year to reflect  the national  income account  ratio  of compensation  to wages and 
salaries.  In addition,  since the fixed-weight  index  excludes  pay  of salaried  workers,  which 
the compensation  index does not, I adjusted  the former  so that  its trend  over the postwar 
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wage industries  is presumably  also a shift  toward  industries  with higher 
productivity. The procyclical movements in the raw compensation 
index, generated  by changes  in employment  mix, are  matched  by similar 
movements  in productivity-the one cancels out the other, and there is 
no net effect on standard  unit labor costs for the economy as a whole. 
But Clark's  standard  unit labor  cost index excludes all cyclical produc- 
tivity effects, so that the cyclical effects of product-mix  change on his 
compensation  index are not canceled  out by upward  shifts  in productiv- 
ity. As a consequence he gets a spurious  procyclical  component  in his 
standard  unit labor  costs. In turn  this spurious  component  of unit labor 
cost variations may be canceling a systematic procyclical change in 
Regressions  with  Alternative  Wage  and  Price  Indexesa 
Dependent  variable 
Marginb 
Deflator and  Fixed-weight 
Ratio of  compensation-  wage and 
Coefficient  wage indexes  per-hour index  price indexes 
Time trend, pre-1965  0.24  0.05  -0.12 
(1.9)  (0.3)  (-1.1) 
Change  in trend, 1965  -0.39  -0.78  -1.25 
(-2.1)  (-3.0)  (-6.5) 
Change  in trend, 1971  0.09  0.41  1.45 
(0.6)  (1.7)  (8.0) 
Output  GAP(- 1)  0.08  0.09  0.23 
(1.6)  (1.4)  (4.9) 
Output  GAP(-2)  0.14  0.05  0.24 
(2.1)  (0.7)  (4.0) 
Output GAP(-3)  .  .  .  0.07  0.14 
(0.9)  (2.4) 
Summary statistic 
R  2  0.75  0.97  0.98 
Standard  error  0.46  0.51  0.38 
Durbin-Watson  1.41  1.78  2.07 
a.  All equations  fit to  1960-80  with annual data; the years  of price control and price control  "snapback"  (1972- 
75) were excluded.  Equations  were fit in logs of variables but results were scaled in the table to relate to percentage 
ratios and changes.  Constant  not shown.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
b.  Partial adjustment  coefficient  constrained  to  1.0. Clark-type  productivity  equations  were  used  to  derive  the 
standard unit  labor  costs;  Clark's  dating  of  time  trends  was  used;  and  my  own  estimate  of  the  direct  effect  of 
domestic  energy  price increases  was  subtracted from price indexes  for  1974-80.  No  autoregression  correction  was 
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margins.  That  may  be one of the reasons  why Gordon,  who uses a fixed- 
weight  wage  index, finds  a systematic  effect of the output  gap  on margins 
while Clark  does not. 
The second and third columns of my table present the output gap 
coefficients  obtained  by fitting  margin  equations  similar  to Clark's  (the 
price control years, 1972-75, were excluded rather  than handled  with 
questionable  annual dummies). The second column is an imitation  of 
Clark's  equation and is based on the private nonfarm  deflator  and the 
raw compensation index. The third column is based on fixed-weight 
wage and price indexes. When the margin changes are defined as 
changes in the deflator  relative to the raw compensation  index in the 
second column, then  just as Clark  finds, there is no significant  cyclical 
component. But when the fixed-weight  indexes are used, a long-lagged 
cyclical effect is evident. 
My main point is not to assert with any confidence that margins 
definitely  behave in a procyclical  manner-the length  of the lags on the 
output  gap is hard  to rationalize  as a purely  demand-induced  phenome- 
non. But this demonstration  at least suggests that there are severe 
aggregation  problems  when one tries to infer  the contribution  of margin 
changes to changes in capital's share of income on the basis of price, 
wage, and productivity  indexes whose weighting  schemes are not the 
theoretically  appropriate  ones. 
Ignoring  changes  in indirect  taxes, capital's  share  could  change  either 
because (1) the constantly weighted average of individual industry 
margins  had changed,  or (2) output  had shifted  to industries  with higher 
(or lower) capital  intensity, or (3) output  had shifted toward  industries 
whose return  on capital  was in disequilibrium  and  temporarily  higher  (or 
lower) than average. To test whether  the first  factor has contributed  to 
margin  changes, it would be necessary to take a price index weighted 
with base or given-year  weights and compare  it with a unit labor cost 
index  weighted  correspondingly  with  base  or  given-year  weights.  Clark's 
margin  index is related  to the appropriate  index as follows. 
Clark's  margin  =  ULC-  ULCy  =(L  A  ) 
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where 
Pf  =  deflator in year t 
ULCI  =  raw unit labor  cost index derived by dividing  the aggregate 
payroll  by aggregate  hours 
ULCf =  given-year  weighted  standard  unit  labor  cost index 
=  the current unit labor cost  of producing current output 
divided by base period  unit labor  cost of producing  current 
output3 
Lo =  economy-wide  base period  labor  share 
(LoAt)i  =  base  period  unit  labor  share  in  industry  i multiplied  by current 
output  share  of industry  i. 
Shifts in output  toward  industries  with a lower base period  labor share 
(higher  base period  capital  share)  will show up in Clark's  margin  index 
as a change in capital share due to margin  changes, whereas it was in 
fact due to an output  shift. Moreover,  even if it were possible to isolate 
a "true" margin  change from the effects of an output shift, we would 
have to sort out shifts to more  capital-intensive  industries  from shifts to 
industries  whose returns  are high  for disequilibrium  reasons in order  to 
draw  any conclusions  about  the equilibrium  or disequilibrium  nature  of 
the change  in shares.  The  fact that  from 1959  to 1980  the private  nonfarm 
deflator  cumulatively  changed by 7 percent relative to a fixed-weight 
deflator because of mix shifts should warn us that such shifts could 
conceivably  be an important  element  in explaining  changes in the share 
of capital. Most of the relative shift of aggregate  supply curves among 
individual industries, which led to the changing relationship of the 
deflator  to the fixed-weight  index, may well have been due to relative 
changes  in unit  labor  costs. But to assume that  fact begs the question. 
Let me turn to Clark's  conclusions with respect to a falling capital 
share. He concentrates  on cyclically adjusted  net income  to capital  as a 
share  of GNP. But since the mid-1960s  the share  of economic deprecia- 
tion in GNP has risen steadily as the stock of equipment  has grown 
relative  to the stock of plant. As Bosworth  has pointed  out,4  the flow of 
capital  services has risen relative  to the capital  stock. If the production 
3. A "true"  unit  labor  cost index  cannot  be constructed  by dividing  a base  (given)  year 
wage  index  by a base (given)  year  productivity  index. 
4.  Barry  P. Bosworth,  "Capital  Formation  and  Economic  Policy,"  BPEA,  2:1982,  pp. 
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function is Cobb-Douglas  in terms of the relationship  between gross 
output and the flow of capital services, then should we not expect 
constancy in the gross share of capital  income?  Further,  gross product 
at factor costs (that is, excluding  indirect  taxes) should be used as the 
denominator  in measuring  the functional  income shares. On this basis, 
the cyclically adjusted  gross return  to capital  as a percent  of gross factor 
income in 1980-83 had almost recovered  to the level of the second half 
of the 1960s,  although  not to the peak ratios  of the 1955-64  period. The 
magnitude  of the remaining  "squeeze" to be explained  may not be so 
large  after  all. 
Clark speculates that the squeeze on profits that started  in the late 
1960s  and  lasted through  the 1970s  might  have resulted  from  the relative 
scarcity  of labor  resources: "Generally  tight  labor  market  conditions  in 
the late 1960s  and  early 1970s  could have shifted  the balance  of power  in 
favor of labor,  cutting  into capital's share.  " From  the standpoint  of real 
wages and functional  income shares, the only relevant meaning  to the 
term  "scarcity  of labor  resources"  is its scarcity  relative  to other  factors, 
principally  capital.  An increasing  "scarcity"  of labor,  therefore,  implies 
a rise in the marginal  (and average)  product  of labor and a larger  than 
trend  rise in the capital-labor  ratio. These conditions  might  indeed  have 
characterized  the investment  boom of the 1960s  and explained  the rise 
in labor's  share  during  those years. But they are not typical  of the 1970s. 
The  growth  of the labor  force was enormous  and  above  trend;  the growth 
in the capital-labor  ratio  was subnormal;  and  the growth  rate  of average 
labor productivity fell (implying a decline in marginal  productivity 
growth).  The stylized facts of the last seven or eight years of the 1970s 
just do not  fit  Clark's  explanation,  and  it is hard  to believe that  adjustment 
lags are so long as to cause shares during  the 1970s  to move as if the 
investment  boom of the 1960s  were still in operation. 
General  Discussion 
Much  of the discussion centered on evidence about the productivity 
trend.  Martin  Baily reported  that  productivity  data  from  manufacturing 
suggested  the trend  was improving,  even though  there was little sign of 
it in data that Clark  had analyzed  for the nonfarm  business sector as a 
whole. He pointed out that data on both sectors posed measurement 
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it hard  to estimate  manufacturing  output,  while  uncertainty  about  output 
price indexes elsewhere in the economy made it difficult  to estimate 
nonfarm  business output as a whole. He concluded that one ought to 
pay attention to available data from both sectors. Not only did the 
manufacturing  data suggest some recovery had occurred  in the produc- 
tivity trend, but the improvement  in energy prices, demographics,  and 
inflation-potential sources of productivity  weakness in the past-also 
pointed in that direction. Baily further  observed that there was great 
uncertainty  about how to cyclically adjust  productivity  or how to make 
cyclical  comparisons  of this  recession  and  expansion  with  previous  ones. 
For all these reasons, he regarded  it as premature  to make  judgments 
about  the current  productivity  trend. 
Benjamin Friedman  reasoned that, regardless of whether one ex- 
pected an improved  productivity  trend, it was simply  too early to judge 
the trend  coming  out of the recent recession. Moreover,  it was also too 
early  for the improved  fundamentals  to have had  any  effect. Tax  changes 
to enhance  capital  spending  and research  and development  by business 
and the stabilization  of oil prices were both developments  that might 
ultimately  be favorable  for productivity.  But nobody should have ex- 
pected any measurable  effect this soon. George Perry agreed that the 
benefits  of capital  formation  were modest  at best and,  in any case, would 
not yet exist, because capital formation had been depressed by the 
recession and high  interest  rates. However, he did  find  it surprising  that 
the economy-wide  data  analyzed  by Clark  revealed  no improvement  in 
productivity that might have come from changing work rules and 
improving management  efficiencies; the deep recession and foreign 
competition  had presumably  spurred  attempts  to improve  productivity 
and reduce costs in these ways, and such effects would have shown up 
by now if they were significant.  He also believed  that  if higher  fuel costs 
had been an important  part  of the productivity  slowdown, enough  time 
had  passed for their  depressing  effects to have vanished,  since oil prices 
had  been stable  or declining  since 1980. 
Charles  Holt suggested  that  the difficult  problem  of adjusting  produc- 
tivity  for the business cycle might  be addressed  more  directly  than  Clark 
had done.  Clark based his adjustment on the operations research 
literature  in which a business understands  its cost structure  and  derives 
optimal  decision rules for employment  based on it. In place of Clark's 
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adjustment  toward  that  target,  Holt suggested  using  overtime  hours  and 
regular  hours separately. Regular  hours include a variable  amount of 
slack, while overtime hours more nearly reflect periods when labor is 
being  fully utilized, with little slack and  maximum  productivity.  At such 
times, the regular  hours  are  also being  used effectively. Thus  the amount 
of overtime  becomes a useful  proxy  for the amount  of slack  in total  hours 
worked. Holt reasoned that, since slack actually  accounts for much of 
the strong  cycle in productivity,  that cycle could be better isolated and 
taken  into account  by explicitly  using overtime  hours. 
Edward  Denison reinforced  Clark's  main  conclusion  that  there is no 
evidence of an improved  productivity  trend  as yet. In contrast  to Baily, 
Denison argued  that  aggregate  data  were far more  reliable  than  the data 
for manufacturing,  and reported that detailed estimates of potential 
national  income  per  potential  hour  worked  in the nonresidential  business 
sector slowed from a 3.1 percent annual  growth  rate between 1948  and 
1973 to only a 0.6 percent growth rate from 1973 to  1982. Such an 
enormous difference could  not  be  eliminated by  any  alternative 
adjustment  procedure  for inferring  potential  from actual  data. Further- 
more, when he broke the latter period in two, he found a 0.9 percent 
growth  rate  in productivity  from 1973  to 1979  and  no productivity  growth 
at all between 1979  and 1982.  Although  the 1979-82 estimate  is subject 
to error  because of the short  data  period, Denison reasoned  that even a 
cyclical adjustment substantially different from his own would not 
reverse the verdict that the productivity  trend was still very slow by 
historical  standards. 
Edmund  Phelps observed that the major  decline in the capital share 
that Clark had measured might be explained by the model he had 
developed earlier  with Sidney Winter  in which a substantial  part of a 
firm's  profits  represents  a return  to goodwill rather  than to capital. As 
real  interest  rates decline, firms  become more  price  competitive  as they 
"invest" more intensively  for customers'  goodwill  in order  to improve 
profits  over a longer  horizon.  High  real  interest  rates, by contrast,  cause 
firms  to discount the future  relative to the present  and lead them to try 
to increase  present  profits  rather  than  present  goodwill.  Phelps  suggested 
this  behavior  might  explain  the large  decline  in the capital  share  between 
the 1960s  and 1970s  and would also predict a rise in the capital share 
now that  the real  interest  rate has risen so much. 